Can nudging reduce default rates? : a field experiment testing the effect of nudging on young adult´s propensity to default on cell phone bills by Bjelland, Jorunn Lie & Stene, Erlend
  
University of Agder, 2013 
Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences 
Department of Economics and Business Administration / Kristiansand School of 
Management 
This Master’s Thesis is carried out as a part of the education at the 
University of Agder and is therefore approved as a part of this 
education. However, this does not imply that the University answers 
for the methods that are used or the conclusions that are drawn. 
 
 
Can nudging reduce default rates? 
 
A field experiment testing the effect of nudging on young adults’ propensity 
to default on cell phone bills. 
 
 
Jorunn Lie Bjelland  
and  
Erlend Stene 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor 
Ellen Katrine Nyhus 
  
  
  
i 
 
Abstract 
Can altering the context in which people make their decisions be an effective method for 
reducing default rates? This thesis reports the results of an experiment that tested the effect of so-
called «nudging» on young adults’ decision-making process concerning bill payments. Based on 
theories of judgment and decision-making, text messages were sent out to 2500 randomized 
treatment and control subjects aged 18-30, pulled from One Call’s (Network Norway AS) 
customer base. Incoming payments were then recorded to determine whether the messages had 
influenced customers’ decision to pay their bill within due. The results provide evidence that 
nudging may positively influence people’s decisions, and subsequently reduce default rates, if the 
nudge is executed correctly. 
The aim of this study has been to test existing theories and models in this field of research in a 
new context, thereby contributing to further development and hopefully active use of nudging as 
a positive alternative to regulations. This could benefit each individual being nudged, and 
ultimately bring out positive larger scale societal changes. 
Our hope is that companies that deal with payment collection will benefit from this research. 
Although former studies have shown the effect of nudging in different contexts, the results might 
not be directly transferrable to payment rates. We have therefore opted to empirically test the 
effect of nudging in a new context; on customers’ payment behavior. 
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default rate, bill payments, cell phone industry.  
ii 
 
Preface 
This Master’s Thesis is written as a final part of the Master`s Programme in Business 
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the concept of nudging, a term belonging to the field of behavioral economics, which lies in the 
gap between economics and psychology. Behavioral economics has been a central part of several 
subjects during our Master’s degree, particularly in the course ORG-419: Judgment and 
Decision-making, which we both attended last fall. It is especially this course that sparked our 
interest for the field and a desire to further explore the concept of nudging. 
Writing a thesis is a demanding process. Through the process we have been challenged both 
academically, personally and in terms of team work. Overcoming these challenges has made us 
better equipped to face the workplace we are at the verge of entering. In spite of the tight 
schedule, we recognized the need to take time to wonder and let the information sink in, to fully 
capture the essence of our project and how to express ourselves accurately in this thesis. We hope 
that this is reflected in the final thesis. 
Conducting a field experiment in such a limited time period carried many risks. Had we fully 
grasped the extent of these risks and the challenges ahead before we started this project, it might 
have never happened. Luckily we were blissfully unaware of the frustration to come, and we are 
very pleased with the overall process. 
We would like to use this opportunity to express our gratitude and appreciation to several people 
for their invaluable help and support. First and foremost; we thank our supervisor Professor Ellen 
Katrine Nyhus for her enthusiasm, constructive feedback and support throughout the process. Her 
knowledge of and dedication to this field of research has been a strong asset in the process. 
Further, we thank Frode Elverum, Per Ola Stålberg and Bente Gjertsen at One Call (Network 
Norway AS) for believing on our project and making the necessary resources available for the 
implementation. We also thank Associate Professor Rotem Shneor and PhD Research Fellow 
Andrew Muteti Musau for valuable input and discussions, and Research Librarian Henry 
Langseth for technical support. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether changing the context in which people make 
their decisions may have an effect on, and subsequently reduce, people’s propensity to default 
payments. The study is motivated by an increasing concern for the rising debt levels in Norway, 
especially for young adults. 
Current Western societies are often labeled as being excessively regulated. Some say that the law 
already interferes with individuals’ freedom of choice, micromanaging the private sphere.  As 
formal laws have limited bounds concerning the regulation of private life, researchers recognize a 
need for alternative ways to encourage people to make better choices for themselves, ultimately 
benefitting society as a whole. We see the potential in nudging as a positive alternative to more 
intervening forms of regulations, so long that it is used exclusively for positive purposes. 
According to classical economic theory, all participants in the marketplace are assumed to be 
rational actors. By studying the effects of nudging, we investigate the implications of modifying 
this standard economic assumption, examining the possibility that actors in the economy deviate 
from the rational standard. «Nudging» is a relatively new term, first coined by Thaler and 
Sunstein in 2008. But the interest for research on this phenomenon has rapidly gained 
momentum; David Cameron and Barack Obama are big advocates of nudge theory, and it is 
catching on in companies all over the world. 
The media fronts a growing concern for the state of young adults in Norway regarding their 
personal finances. Norwegian collection agencies and other institutions express a well-grounded 
concern for the increasing number of young adults that find themselves in financial difficulties 
due to defaulted payments and debt problems. We wanted to explore whether nudging might help 
change this negative development in personal finances for young adults. The primary reason for 
examining the effects of nudging on young adults’ propensity to default on bill payments is that 
we have not been able to uncover any previous studies performed concerning this particular issue. 
As cell phone bills are highlighted in the media as bills that are typically defaulted on, we have 
focused our thesis on these particular payments. 
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With our thesis we aim to contribute to the growing field of research on how people’s choices can 
be influenced in beneficial ways. We want to test the psychological tool of nudging in a context 
where it has not to our knowledge been tested before; on actual payment rates. Our goal is to 
lower the number of young adults that default their bills, serving a sociopolitical purpose as well 
as the purpose of bettering personal finances for individuals. The study was designed to answer 
the following research question;  
Can nudging young adults reduce their propensity to default on cell phone bills? 
We start this thesis with an overview of the current state of personal finances of young adults in 
Norway, and the theoretical foundation that sparked our interest to further investigate the effects 
of nudging. We then move on to a review of relevant experiments, examining what studies in the 
field already have discovered, and possible weaknesses in the performed research. In the next 
chapter we address the specific type of methods used to perform this study, introduce the 
experiment and the procedure for its implementation. We then present the results of our study. 
Based on these findings, we argue that nudging may significantly lower default rates. The thesis 
closes with a discussion of our findings, the limitations and implications of the study, and 
conclusions that can be drawn on the basis of our experiment. 
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2. Background and theoretical foundation 
2.1 Background 
Recent studies and statistics have shown a significant increase in the amount of outstanding credit 
debt in Norway, particularly owed by young adults, raising valid cause for concern. Outstanding 
credit debt includes money owed to credit card companies, sums owed or defaulted on 
uncollateralized loans, and money owed to collection agencies. By the end of 2011, young adults 
in Norway between the age of 19 and 26 owed NOK 1,1 billion to the aforementioned institutions 
(Stenseng, 2012). This is an increase of NOK 200 million from the year before (Stenseng, 2012).  
Brusdal and Berg (2011) recently published a report on young adults in Norway and their credit-
financed consumption. The report was developed based on statistics from collecting- and credit 
agencies, and caused governmental concern and initiative to investigate these issues further. The 
report documented a sharp increase in the number of young adults who default on credit loans 
and bill payments. In 2011, one in four who defaulted payments to the extent of forced debt 
collection, was between 18-25 years old (Brusdal & Berg, 2011). Further, the number of young 
adults that were registered with reduced credit scores had increased by 50% since 2005 (Brusdal 
& Berg, 2011). 
The report states that young adults is not the age group with the largest default problems. Adults 
ranging from 40 to 44 years of age is actually the age group with the most severe financial 
problems (Brusdal & Berg, 2011). Young adults is, however, the age group that accounts for the 
sharpest increase in default rates and more frequently end up having debt problems. We have 
chosen to focus on young adults due to the severity of this development, and also because of the 
detrimental effects that having poor credit rates may have later in life. Young adults with poor 
credit ratings will have a difficult time getting approved for mortgages, and the credit debt they 
build up in the initial phases of adult life may have crippling effects on their personal finances 
later on. 
Brusdal and Berg’s report discusses a variety of partially interconnected reasons for why so many 
young adults accumulate staggering amounts of credit debt and default on their bill payments. 
There are two factors that seem to be more prevalent than others: a lack of knowledge concerning 
money and contract management, and a level of consumption that is not sustainable with the 
10 
 
income and funds available to them (Brusdal & Berg, 2011). Young adults are entering a phase in 
life where they encounter new and unfamiliar situations. At this stage of the life-cycle, many are 
becoming financially independent for the first time, have just moved away from home, and many 
are students whose sole source of income are part-time jobs, student loans and scholarships. They 
sign contracts for housing, cell phone plans, internet and electricity, that all have to be managed 
and paid for. Most young adults have very limited knowledge and experience in this field, 
making them vulnerable for failure and exploitation if they are not fully grasping what they are 
getting into (Brusdal & Berg, 2011). At the same time, young adults have a relatively high 
consumption compared to their income, and when compared to previous generations and other 
stages of the life cycle, their social arena is highly commercialized. This can easily lead to unwise 
spending and consumption, and subsequently credit financed consumption due to a lack of 
sufficient funds (Brusdal & Berg, 2011).  
Brusdal and Berg’s report (2011) divides consumption into three categories; food and shelter as 
the most basic, consumption of social goods comes second, and lastly experience and pleasure 
consumption. Naturally, most of the 1000 respondents who were interviewed for this study listed 
basic goods as their first priority. Further, the authors uncovered that the majority of respondents 
reported that the consumption of social and pleasure goods was so important that they would feel 
poor if they were not able to extensively participate in the social arena (Brusdal & Berg, 2011). 
These goods and experiences were perceived to be so important that these young adults would to 
a large extent rather finance them with credit, than saving up the money beforehand and enjoy 
such goods and experiences less often. This attitude towards consumption may help explain why 
many young adults are defaulting on their bills and have substantial, and growing, credit debt 
(Brusdal & Berg, 2011).  
Another contributing reason for why young adults are prone to wind up in financial difficulties is 
explained by Gulbrandsen (1999). In a report published by NOVA, Gulbrandsen proposes that 
defaulting on bill payments depends on the individual’s willingness to pay, as he labels as the 
individual’s «morality», as opposed to ability to pay. In his study, he found that timely bill 
payments are correlated with a person’s morality, and that morality is highly related to age. 
Gulbrandsen suggests that morality is developed through the stages of the life cycle, and that 
people are therefore more likely to keep up with bill payments as they get older.  
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Further, Brusdal and Berg divide young adults into four categories based on the behavioral 
characteristics that got them into financial difficulties. These categories are set up along two 
dimensions; whether the problem is perceived to be caused by themselves or by external forces, 
and whether the individual made active or passive choices in the process.  
Table 2.1: Behavioral characteristics of young adults who find themselves in financial difficulties 
 Passive Active 
Problem caused by the 
individual 
The absent-minded: Little to 
none control or overview 
concerning personal finances 
The shopper: Short-sighted 
individuals that constantly 
overdraw their accounts 
Problem caused by 
external forces 
The victim: Individuals that feel 
they have been tricked by the 
“system”, i.e. complicated 
financial systems 
The juggler: Operates within the 
system with relative ease and 
competence, but will inevitably 
end up in trouble 
(Source: Brusdal & Berg, 2011, p.39) 
1. The absent-minded: 
These are young adults whose financial problems stem from a lack of knowledge and negligence 
concerning their personal finances. They have a tendency of not opening their bills, forget or 
misplace them, and will typically not engage in mental accounting.  
2. The shopper: 
These individuals will get into financial distress mainly due to a consumption pattern that is not 
supported by their income. They are impulsive shoppers that are not conscious how excessive 
spending will affect their personal finances. Future consequences are disregarded, which often 
results in overdrawn accounts and increasing debt. 
3. The victim: 
The victims blame their financial problems on complex financial systems and the availability of 
easy credit. In their opinion, commercial banks and credit companies are too vigilant in giving 
out credit, and the victim feels “forced” to use the credit cards or credit opportunities they 
receive.  
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4. The juggler: 
These individuals have extensive knowledge about how financial systems and credit markets 
function. They use this knowledge to acquire and postpone financial obligations. Often they will 
juggle several credit loans and credit cards to spread the debt, to avoid facing consequences with 
any of the companies they are juggling. Also, they tend to pay off outstanding credit with credit 
from other institutions. Much like Ponzi-financing, this is only sustainable for some time before it 
all comes to a halt. 
These four categories do not consider individual differences and circumstances, but represent 
stereotypical traits that describe generalized mindsets that recur in the study. They serve to give 
an overview of how different mindsets may lead to the same consequences. Individuals who have 
traits falling under each of these categories may affect the outcome of our study.  
The objective of our thesis is to test whether it is possible to influence the decision-making 
process of young adults. In doing this, we are testing if we can reduce propensity to default on 
payments by using a fairly cheap tool without introducing forced regulations; namely nudging 
people’s behavior. We will now introduce the theoretical perspective for this thesis and go more 
in depth on the theories that support our approach to this issue. 
2.2 Making the right decisions 
Making decisions, or rather, making wise decisions is an aspect of life that most individuals are 
trying to master in the best possible way. We are faced with an array of decisions every day. 
Some decisions are trivial and simple while others are life-changing and very difficult to make. 
We make decisions continuously as we go about our day, standardizing some of the decisions to 
become subconscious choices. But we are sometimes faced with decisions that need to be made 
only once in a lifetime. Although we have a sense of what it means to make decisions, Jonathan 
Baron (2008) has defined a decision as follows: 
«A decision is a choice of action - of what to do or not to do. Decisions are made to achieve 
goals, and they are based on beliefs about what actions will achieve the given goals» (Baron, 
2008, p.6). 
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Given that decision-making means choosing actions to achieve our goals, how should individuals 
go about choosing their actions? To answer this question we introduce theoretical models related 
to the field of judgment and decision-making.  
There are three different categories of models that are used in different fields of study; descriptive 
models, prescriptive models and normative models. Within judgment and decision-making, 
descriptive models are models or theories that describe how people think and behave (Baron, 
2008). E.g. how most people make a given decision. Prescriptive models are models that explain 
how individuals ought to think and act (Baron, 2008). E.g. how most people should make a 
decision compared to how they actually do make the decision. To be able to decide which 
prescriptive models are most useful we apply a normative model, which is the standard that 
defines what ways of thinking and choosing are best for achieving our individual goals (Baron, 
2008). Normative models evaluate thinking and decision-making in terms of personal goals. In 
the field of judgment and decision-making the normative model will consist of the policy, or 
pattern of choices, that will achieve these goals to the greatest extent in the long run (Baron, 
2008). 
The normative model for decision-making dictates that people should pay their bills on time in 
order to avoid late-fees and undesirable ripple effects in their personal finances. However, 
observations show that a significant number of people default on bill payments every month. This 
can be viewed as individuals departing from the normative model for decision-making, and 
represents the descriptive model for our case. Prescriptive models describe ways to lessen the gap 
between the normative and descriptive model; how can we influence people to pay their bills 
more promptly? One possibility is forced methods; either by introducing pre-paid subscriptions 
only, automatic draws for people’s bank account, or closing the subscription the following day if 
payment is not made. Here, we are testing a prescriptive model aiming to preserve freedom of 
choice while giving nudges to influence people’s choices, giving them a mild push in the right 
direction.  
Most people strive to reach their goals in life. We wish to have great careers, own property, get 
married and have children, and live happy and fulfilling lives. Financial difficulties and reduced 
credit scores may hinder us from achieving such long-term goals. If people made their choices 
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exclusively according to the normative models for decision-making, they would, in theory, 
achieve all their long-term goals in life. 
2.3 Biases and heuristics 
One of the main problems related to human decision-making is that we are not always able to 
make decisions that will best achieve our goals in the long run. Despite having good intentions, 
we observe bad decisions being made all around us. People choose to smoke, eat unhealthy 
foods, drive faster than the speed limit, skip work, or neglect to pay their bills on time. These 
decisions are made in spite of the obvious fact that the choices will have negative consequences. 
So why do we make such choices, even though we are at least partially aware of immediate or 
future consequences? 
We can find some answers by looking into previous research conducted in the field of judgment 
and decision-making. In “Heuristics and Biases” (Kahneman, Gilovich, & Griffin, 2002), the 
authors discuss how the models and understanding of decision-making have changed over time. 
For a long period of time the classical model of rational choice was the prevalent view on how 
individuals make their decisions (Kahneman et al., 2002). This model has been prevailing in the 
field of economics and has also had considerable influence in behavioral and social sciences 
(Kahneman et al., 2002). The model of rational choice stipulates that a rational actor, which is 
represented by any given individual, will choose what option to pursue by assessing the 
probabilities of different outcomes, judging the utility that can be derived from each possible 
outcome, and combining these assessments to make their choice. The optimal combination of 
probability and utility is the option that will be pursued (Kahneman et al., 2002). Calculating 
these probabilities and multiattribute utilities may be difficult, but the rational choice model still 
assumes that people are able to do it, and that people do it well.  The theory does not claim that 
mistakes are never made, but the theory is insistent on the fact that mistakes are unsystematic 
(Kahneman et al., 2002). 
With time, this model came under scrutiny. Several researchers made contributions to the 
judgment and decision-making literature that made the classical model loose much of its 
foothold. According to Grove (2005), Paul Meehl (1954) found that there were significant 
discrepancies between clinicians’ assessment of their own performance and their actual records 
of success. These irrational assessments inspired further research on the faulty inferences made 
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by individuals (Grove, 2005). In 1964, Ward Edwards introduced Bayesian analysis into the field 
of psychology, which provided a normative standard with which trivial decisions could be 
compared (Edwards, Lindman, & Savage, 1963). From Edward’s own research it became clear 
that intuitive judgments by individuals did not correspond with the normative standard (Edwards 
et al., 1963). Herbert Simon also developed significant theories in this field. In his work from 
1955, Simon concludes that the “omnipotent” rationality, as described by the rational choice 
model, was an unrealistic standard for human judgment (Simon, 1955). He proposed the concept 
of bounded rationality, which acknowledged the processing limitations of the human mind. The 
concept of bounded rationality states that people make rational choices, but only within the 
constraints of limited search, knowledge and computing capabilities (Simon, 1955). 
Later, Kahneman and Tversky would develop their own unique perspective on bounded 
rationality, inspired by the examples of biased real-world judgments by the aforementioned 
authors. In their most influential work from 1982, Kahneman and Tversky explored different 
heuristics and how these may lead to systematically biased decisions (Kahneman, Tversky, & 
Slovic, 1982). A heuristic is explained to be a rule of thumb; a simple and more or less efficient 
rule which people tend to use when forming judgments and making decisions (Kahneman et al., 
1982). In most situations people do not have the time, resources or capabilities to make 
exhausting searches for information. We therefore use heuristics as mental shortcuts, often only 
focusing on very few aspects of the decision while discarding others (Kahneman et al., 1982). 
Such heuristics have proven to be very useful in many situations, and the consequences of 
making decisions based on heuristics are usually trivial. E.g. if you know that one handful of 
pasta feeds one person, you assume that four handfuls will feed four people. You do not take the 
time to measure the amount of pasta accurately, nor do you research the nutritional values of 
pasta to fit a larger group of people. The problem occurs when these heuristics lead to individuals 
deviating from normative theories, making systematically biased decisions. Biased decisions can 
be described as departures from the normative rational theory that serves as markers for related 
heuristics (Kahneman et al., 2002). 
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2.4 Choice architecture 
Decisions are not made in a vacuum. Research performed on biases and heuristics has shown that 
the context in which individuals make their decisions is significant for the decisions made. 
Researchers therefore point to context-dependent factors as ways to influence individuals’ 
decision-making process. Marketers frequently use this to influence the purchase decision. How 
the different choices are presented in the store, what information is conveyed in the 
advertisement, how the sales process is structured, are all examples of how marketers attempt to 
change the context to influence individuals’ purchasing decisions in a specific direction. While 
marketers use this knowledge to promote their own interests, some also aim to use this 
knowledge to benefit society as a whole. Organizing the context in which we make decisions is 
called “choice architecture”, a term coined by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). E.g. when designing 
employee satisfaction forms for a company, you are a choice architect. When designing the 
layout of a grocery store, you are a choice architect. When putting forward a legal defense in 
front of a jury, you are a choice architect. By changing the context or setting in which individuals 
or groups make their decisions, you may have a significant effect on the decisions that are made. 
This means that everyone, from parents presenting bedtime options to their children to a 
government providing various policies to its citizens, influence choices and actions taken as 
choice architects. 
Choice architects have many different ways to influence choices: e.g. by varying the presentation 
order of alternatives, how to structure the different alternatives, the order of attributes, or 
changing the default option (Johnson et al., 2012). While it might be tempting to believe that 
choices can be presented in a “neutral state”, the reality is that there is no neutral state. Any way 
that the choice is presented and conducted might influence the choice of the decision-maker 
(Johnson et al., 2012). Consider the following: All choices will have a default option; the selected 
option when the decision-maker chooses not to make a choice between alternatives. A given 
option is more likely to be chosen if it is set to be the default option (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). 
This means that in many cases, a choice architect – being any given individual, can increase the 
probability of an alternative being chosen simply by making this alternative the default option. 
Given that we have the ability to influence choices by changing the environment, there are also 
possibilities to enhance the quality of the decisions made. In their book, “Nudge”, Thaler and 
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Sunstein (2008) discuss how choice architects should alter the environment in which people make 
their decisions, in order to nudge people into making decisions that are objectively better for 
themselves in the long run (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). If people made better decision for 
themselves, this may in turn benefit the entire community. 
2.5 Nudging – on how to improve decisions 
To nudge is formally defined as «to push mildly or poke gently in the ribs, especially with the 
elbow – to alert, remind, or mildly warn another» (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p.4). However, 
Thaler and Sunstein uses the term about facilitating the environment in which people make their 
decisions so that people can make better choices; giving them a slight “push” in the direction of 
making a better decision than they otherwise might have. A nudge is any aspect of choice 
architecture that influences people’s behavior in a predictable way without denying any options 
or significantly changing incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be fairly 
easy and cheap to avoid (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). If it is not, it simply crosses over to 
functioning as a forced regulation. Nudges are not orders; while putting fruit items at eye level or 
closer to the cashier is a nudge, banning junk food is not. A nudge will not influence “Econs”; 
unbiased individuals who respond to incentives only, but will significantly alter the behavior of 
“Humans”; biased individuals who respond to incentives as well as nudges (Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008). By properly making use of both incentives and nudges, one may be able to help solve 
many of society’s problems while ensuring individuals’ freedom of choice. 
People might need a nudge in different situations. Usually, people tend to need nudges when 
faced with decisions that are difficult and rare, for which they do not get prompt feedback, and 
when they struggle to translate the aspects of the situation into easily understandable terms 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Also, we might need nudges in situations where it is difficult to 
exercise self-control; typically when the consequences of a certain choice are not experienced 
until some time has passed (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). 
There are six main categories of nudges, defined by Thaler and Sunstein (2008), which are 
further explained below. Each type of nudge is typically used for different purposes and contexts. 
The objective of using any kind of nudge is always the same; helping individuals to make better 
and more informed choices. 
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iNcentives – making incentives salient if they are hidden. E.g. credit card companies have a 
tendency to make interest and contractual information difficult to find and difficult to understand 
for the general population. By properly informing customers about prices and conditions, people 
would be better equipped to make well-informed choices. 
In terms of bill payments, one could introduce concise and detailed information sheets that are 
sent out to all new customers when applying for subscriptions. By doing this, customers would 
become aware of the possible consequences of late payment at an early stage, and this would 
hopefully help reduce late payments. 
Understand mapping – helping people to structure complex choices, to enhance their ability to 
choose the option that will make them better off.  An example could be RECAP (Record, 
Evaluate, and Compare Alternative Prices), which is a program making it possible for consumers 
to find and compare prices from many different suppliers. This type of nudge is often used by 
consumer organizations by offering customers help with calculations.  
Helping people with mapping could also be used in the context we are currently researching. One 
could make a RECAP program for the particular industry, where consumers could compare and 
review all the different service providers to see which company that would best suit their needs. 
By helping people choose the best suitable provider, one might reduce default payments. 
Defaults – people tend to go for the default options, because of inertia, the status quo bias, 
laziness or other reasons. Choice architects may use this by letting the best outcome in the view 
of the receiver be the default option, e.g. making the safest pension plan the default in a company. 
Making automatic bill payments the default payment option, could help reduce defaults for 
customers. People tend to go with the default option, and not make active choices. Having more 
customers using this feature one could reduce the amount of default payments. 
Give feedback – letting people know when they are doing well and when they are not, and give 
warnings when poor decisions are detected in time to change them. 
Giving customers positive reinforcement when they pay on time, or warning them when they are 
about to default payment, may influence the customer to keep paying on time in the future, or 
giving them the opportunity to correct their mistake if they are about to default. This can be done 
by emails or text messages, informing the customer that the payment has been received, or 
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sending out a message some time before the payment is due to remind the customer about a bill 
that needs to be paid.  
Expect error – arranging choices so that it is difficult for people to make mistakes. E.g. the diesel 
nozzle does not fit gasoline cars, making it impossible for people to fill their vehicles with the 
wrong fuel. Another example of this type of nudge is ATMs not giving out cash before the card is 
removed. By having people remove their card first, the probability of leaving ones credit card in 
the machine is reduced.  
If the company expects that a large proportion of their customers will pay the bill late, they could 
set the due date on the invoice to be some time before the bill is actually due. If the customers 
view the due date as the 15
th
, but the company does not consider the payment defaulted before the 
20
th
, they are adjusting for expected errors.  
Structure complex choices - finding simplifying strategies that will ease information gathering 
and choice. 
This type of nudge is very similar to Understanding mapping as this type of nudge aims to find 
ways to simplify information search for people to make choices. One example of this type of 
nudge related to our case is the website www.telepriser.no. By inserting information about typical 
usage pattern, this site helps navigate the jungle of providers by suggesting the subscriptions that 
are best suited for the user’s needs. 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) 
In their work, Thaler and Sunstein present many examples of how it is possible to use nudging as 
psychological tool to influence the decision-making process. These examples are mostly of 
anecdotal nature, giving brief summaries of previous studies or short stories about human quirks 
that can be observed in real life. To have any expectations as to what we can find in our study, we 
need to look further in depth on what research has previously been performed and the results of 
these studies. By specifically looking at experiments performed in settings similar to ours, we 
hope to gain a clearer picture of what we can expect in terms of results from performing our 
study. 
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2.5.1 Review of relevant experiments 
When we started searching for past research on this topic, we found that most articles on 
influencing the decision-making process and behavior were focused on incentives. More 
specifically, much of the research focused on monetary incentives and how this may be used to 
influence decisions. Charness and Gneezy (2009) found that it was possible to significantly 
influence and enhance individuals’ exercise routine by offering financial incentives in a given 
time period. They also found that positive habits formed under this benefit scheme were 
continued after the monetary incentive seized to exist. Similarly, Angrist and Lavy (2009) found 
that it was possible to greatly increase the number of female students that obtained their high 
school diplomas by offering cash incentives for final graduation. There is an abundance of 
research that supports a relationship between financial incentives and changes in behavior, and it 
seems to be a very effective way to perpetuate good habits. However, monetary incentive 
schemes do not fall under the definition of nudges, as they do not align with the characteristics of 
a nudge; they are not easy to implement and they are not cheap to avoid. For our review of 
relevant experiments, we have therefore chosen to focus on research where individuals’ decision-
making process is influenced by other measures than financial incentives. 
An initial problem we were faced with is that “nudging” is a relatively new expression. The term 
was first coined in 2008 and the following research on nudging has been limited. But, when 
drawing on the core principle, namely attempting to influence decision-making processes by 
altering the environment surrounding individuals, there are many helpful studies both prior to and 
after the term itself was defined. Even though none of the articles we have investigated mention 
“nudging” specifically and the theoretical perspectives may vary to some extent, the basic 
principles are quite similar.  
To shed light on what results can be expected from our experiment we have chosen to focus on 
five articles that test the effect of influencing financial choices by the use of non-financial tools. 
For the purpose of comparison, all the experiments conducted in these five articles use the same 
dependent variable; willingness to pay. The research is conducted in different contexts and differs 
in independent variables; what is proposed to influence willingness to pay.  
On the next page is a matrix structuring the differences in contexts, independent variables and 
relevant findings of the five selected studies we found relevant to our experiment. 
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Table 2.2: Recap of selected relevant experiments 
 
 
Article Context Dependent 
variable 
Independent 
variable 
Findings 
Applying behavioral 
insights to reduce 
fraud, error and debt 
(CAB 099-12, 2012) 
A division within the 
UK Cabinet Office 
aimed to influence late 
tax payers to pay their 
taxes. 
Willingness 
to pay. 
Nudging based on 
social norms. 
Nudging based on 
social norms increased 
tax compliance by 15 
%. 
Globalization issues 
and consumers’ 
purchase decisions 
for food products 
(Disdier & Marette, 
2013). 
A laboratory 
experiment to 
investigate how 
globalization issues 
influence willingness 
to pay for food 
products. 
Willingness 
to pay. 
Positive/negative 
information about 
MNC’s. 
Negative information 
about a MNC’s 
operation significantly 
decreased willingness 
to pay for food 
products – and vice 
versa. 
Effects of social 
responsibility 
labeling and brand 
on willingness to pay 
for apparel 
(Hustvedt & 
Bernard, 2010). 
A study examining 
changes in university 
students’ willingness 
to pay for apparel as 
labor-related 
information is added to 
products. 
Willingness 
to pay. 
Presence and 
nature of labor-
related 
information. 
Consumers were 
willing to pay more for 
apparel containing 
information about 
labor-related attributes 
of the apparel. 
What’s in a name? 
(Menegaki, Mellon, 
Vrentzou, 
Koumakis, & 
Tsagarakis, 2009) 
A study examining 
how the agricultural 
sector’s and 
consumers’ 
willingness to pay for 
putrefied water 
changes with 
descriptive terms 
concerning the 
product. 
Willingness 
to pay. 
Descriptive terms 
/ framing of 
alternatives. 
Farmers’ and 
consumer’s 
willingness to use and 
pay for putrefied water 
increased when it was 
called “recycled 
water” instead of 
“treated wastewater”. 
Does attribute 
framing in discrete 
choice experiments 
influence willingness 
to pay? (Kirsten & 
Glenn, 2009). 
Experiment conducted 
to examine whether 
attribute framing 
influences willingness 
to pay for different 
cancer screening 
alternatives. 
Willingness 
to pay. 
Framing the 
presentation of 
alternatives. 
By framing outcomes 
for a given cancer 
screening method in a 
positive manner, the 
researchers increased 
the likelihood of that 
treatment being chosen 
– and vice versa. 
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We have focused our review of past experiments on studies that aimed to influence or change 
attitudes and/or behavior in the decision-making process concerning financial choices. In the 
matrix we have listed willingness to pay as the dependent variable. Willingness to pay is an 
expression that can be used to describe different concepts. The article about tax compliance in the 
UK looked at behavioral changes, and individuals’ willingness to actually pay the taxes they owe. 
The article about globalization issues related to food products, and the article about social 
responsibility labeling of apparel, studied how it is possible influence attitudes and opinions 
related to how much people are willing to pay for a product. The article about treated wastewater 
investigated if it is possible to influence consumers’ attitudes and opinions related to their 
propensity to use or pay for a certain product. Lastly, the article about preferences related to 
screening methods for cancer examined if the framing of risk probabilities may influence 
preferences and how much people are willing to pay for different services. Even though these 
articles are looked at different aspects of willingness to pay, they all attempted to uncover 
whether it is possible to influence the decision-making process, both in terms of attitudes and 
actual behavior, by altering the environment surrounding the decision maker. The goal of our 
thesis is to see whether we can use nudging as psychological tool to influence people’s 
willingness to pay their cell phone bills, and subsequently reduce default rates. 
After reviewing these articles we find that the experiments conducted were all successful and had 
significant results. Even though the research is conducted in different contexts, using different 
independent variables, they all conclude that it is in fact possible to influence consumers’ 
willingness to pay by implementing non-financial measures. From these five studies we can 
conclude that people are not as in control of their own decision-making as they might think they 
are. The surrounding environment, combined with heuristics and biases, will in most cases 
influence people to a greater extent than one might think. In all the presented articles the authors 
show that a wide array of factors may influence the decision-making process and consumers´ 
willingness to pay.  
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«Applying behavioral insights to reduce fraud, error and debt» 
The basis for this experiment was increasing problems with tax fraud and error in declarations 
and debt in the UK. Fraud, error and overdue debt accounts for net losses that amounts to 
approximately 40 billion GBP each year (CAB 099-12, 2012). According to the Behavioral 
Insights Team (BIT), traditional means to solve these problems assume that individuals make 
decisions according to the classic model of rational choice (CAB 099-12, 2012). Rational actors 
will weigh the costs and benefits of committing fraud, default on debt and hand in declarations 
with errors, and refrain from doing so it the costs outweigh the benefits (CAB 099-12, 2012). BIT 
aimed to examine if there was any way to utilize knowledge from behavioral sciences to help 
reduce the billions in lost tax revenue. The researchers found the best results when using social 
norms to influence late taxpayers to pay. Letters were sent to 140.000 late taxpayers, where some 
received control letters (a reminder to pay their outstanding taxes) while others got letters 
containing a reminder combined with statements developed according to social norms (CAB 099-
12, 2012). These social norms were statements like “9 out of 10 people in Britain pay their taxes 
on time”, or that “most of the neighbors have already paid their taxes” (CAB 099-12, 2012). 
Referring to a social norm in a particular area resulted in a 15% increase of payments compared 
to the control letters (CAB 099-12, 2012). This result was significant and could generate 30 
million GBP in extra tax revenue each year (CAB 099-12, 2012). 
“Does attribute framing in discrete choice experiments influence willingness to pay? 
The authors of this article stipulated that when attributes of a certain choice is coupled with 
different risks, an individual is required to process information about probabilities and utility 
values within the bounds or rationality (Kirsten & Glenn, 2009). The authors aimed to test 
whether the way these risk probabilities are framed can influence an individual’s decision-
making process. To test this, an experiment was designed to test if the framing of risk attributes 
related to different screening alternatives for colorectal cancer could influence patients’ 
willingness to pay for a given screening alternative (Kirsten & Glenn, 2009). This was tested by 
mailing surveys to 1920 test subjects enrolled in the Central Coast Rotary Bowelscan Program in 
NSW, Australia. The participants were randomly assigned one of four alternative types of framed 
information, which framed risk attributes differently; either positively or negatively (Kirsten & 
Glenn, 2009). One of the alternatives focused on if the accuracy of a screening method for cancer 
24 
 
that was framed as either “How many cancers the test finds” or “How many cancers the test will 
misses”. The probabilities were the same, but one was expressed with a positive outcome and the 
other with a negative outcome. Another alternative framed the risk associated with a screening 
method as either “The number of people who are correctly reassured that they do not have 
cancer” and “The number of people who have unnecessary colonoscopies” (Kirsten & Glenn, 
2009). 
The study supports the authors’ assumption that framing of outcomes and risk probabilities may 
have a significant influence on an individual’s willingness to pay for a given screening option. 
The authors found that individuals had increased willingness to pay for a given screening method 
if it was framed as cancers found, rather than cancers missed (Kirsten & Glenn, 2009). The same 
was the case for the other aforementioned alternative; test subjects had significantly increased 
willingness to pay if a screening method was framed as how often the screening method could 
rule out cancer, rather than framing it as how often people would get an unnecessary colonoscopy 
(Kirsten & Glenn, 2009). 
«Globalization issues and consumers´ purchase decisions for food products: evidence from a 
lab experiment» 
In this study, the authors examined whether factors related to globalization could affect 
willingness to pay. More specifically, whether information concerning a MNC’s operations could 
affect willingness to pay (Disdier & Marette, 2013). A laboratory experiment was conducted, 
using a sample of 101 men and women aged 20-72 (Disdier & Marette, 2013). Each participant 
was to indicate what price they would pay for a glass of pickles from a traditional and well-
known French brand, Maille. They were informed about a reference price; the average retail price 
for such a jar of pickles (Disdier & Marette, 2013). After being given a reverence price, the test 
subjects were asked to indicate what price they would be willing to pay for this jar of pickles. 
After having stated their price, they were given more information about Maille’s operations. 
First, they were told that Maille, after being bought up by Unilever in 2000, had outsourced the 
supply of pickles from France to India. Next, they were told that Unilever had closed down 
processing facilities in France due to outsourcing (Disdier & Marette, 2013). The third round of 
information conveyed positive information about new products and services from Maille. And 
lastly, the participants were informed about new investments in and by Maille. After each round 
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of new information, the participants were to indicate the maximum price they were willing to pay 
for a jar of Maille pickles (Disdier & Marette, 2013). 
The study found that both positive and negative information about the firm’s operations could 
have significant effect on a subject’s willingness to pay (Disdier & Marette, 2013).Their findings 
regarding the difference in average willingness to pay (WTP) was found to be: 
1. After being informed about retail price: €2,75 per jar 
2. After being informed about outsourcing supply: €2,21 per jar (-19,63% from retail price) 
3. After being informed about the closing of facilities: €2,06 per jar (-25,1% from retail 
price) 
4. After being informed about new products and services: €2,31 per jar (+12% from the 
former price) 
5. After being informed about future investment activities: 2,68 per jar (+31% from the 
lowest WTP) 
(Disdier & Marette, 2013) 
The researchers noticed that negative information about a company’s operations would 
negatively affect WTP among consumers, but this effect was offset by positive information. After 
the subjects were told two negatives, and two positives, the WTP (€2,68) was very similar to the 
initial WTP (€2,75). This showed how consumer WTP may be significantly affected by 
information provided, and opens for the possibility to influence the decision-making process for 
consumers. 
«What´s in a name: framing treated wastewater as recycled water increases willingness to use 
and willingness to pay» 
As the title states, this article looked into the decision-making process of individuals to examine 
whether individuals were more prone to accept a given product if the name/terminology was 
changed. The product in question was treated wastewater, i.e. treated sewage water (Menegaki et 
al., 2009). The background for performing this study was the increasing problems with water 
shortage in the agricultural sector in Crete, Greece. Treated wastewater water could help increase 
the water supply used for irrigation, yet most people had been reluctant or unwilling to adopt this 
source of water (Menegaki et al., 2009). The main reason for farmers’ reluctance to use treated 
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wastewater for irrigation, and consumers’ unwillingness to pay for foods grown with the use of 
this type of water, was that they perceived it as being dirty or unhygienic (Menegaki et al., 2009). 
People seemed to have a difficult time accepting the use of water that has previously contained 
excrement and fecal matter, regardless of the clear evidence provided of the water’s purity 
(Menegaki et al., 2009). By reframing this product as “recycled”, the authors wanted to see if this 
could increase willingness to pay or willingness to accept. The experiment was conducted in 
Crete, Greece, using 1004 test subjects (Menegaki et al., 2009). This sample included both 
consumers and farmers. The subjects were asked to answer questions related to their willingness 
to use and willingness to pay for the product. Half of the respondents were given questions where 
the product was labeled as treated wastewater, while the other half were given questions were the 
product was labeled as recycled water (Menegaki et al., 2009). The results showed a significant 
difference in response caused by this difference in labeling. For each question asked, there were 
four alternative answers: definitely no, probably no, probably yes, and definitely yes. The 
findings can be summarized as follows: 
1. On average, 37% answered definitely no when asked if they would buy or use treated 
wastewater. Only 14% gave a definite no when it was labeled as recycled water. 
2. On average, 28% answered probably not when asked if they would buy or use treated 
wastewater. Only 14% gave a probable no when it was labeled as recycled water. 
3. On average, 21% answered probably yes when asked if they would buy or use treated 
wastewater. But 34% gave a probable yes when it was labeled as recycled water. 
4. On average, 12% answered definitely yes when asked if they would buy or use treated 
wastewater. A staggering 30% gave a definite yes when it was labeled as recycled water. 
(Menegaki et al., 2009) 
Based on these findings  the authors argued that the way in which a product is portrayed or 
framed towards potential users and consumers could have a significant effect on an individual’s 
willingness to use or pay for a certain product. This seems counter intuitive, because the people 
in the experiment were fully aware that treated wastewater and recycled water was exactly the 
same product. According to the rational choice theory, individuals should not be affected by how 
a product is presented, only the intrinsic value of the product. This seemed to not be the case in 
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this experiment; simply altering the name of the product made possible to affect farmers’ 
willingness to use and consumers’ willingness to pay for the specific product. 
«Effects of social responsibility labeling and brand on willingness to pay for apparel» 
This article examined whether or not it was possible to increase consumers’ willingness to pay 
for clothing items by conveying labor-related information on apparel. The study was performed 
at Southern University, US, using 121 university students as subjects (Hustvedt & Bernard, 
2010). The background for this study was the fact that companies are forced to make their 
business practices more in line with ethical codes due to increasing consumer awareness and the 
possibility to lose customers due to unethical practices (Hustvedt & Bernard, 2010). Based on 
this emerging trend, the authors aimed to examine whether this attitude towards ethical awareness 
also could affect willingness to pay (Hustvedt & Bernard, 2010). 
Hustvedt and Bernard tested this by staging 14 experimental auction sessions. Students from a 
variety of departments and collages participated in the auctions. The students were given $40 for 
participating, and could either use this money to place bids in the auction or take home as cash. In 
a series of four steps, the students were to bid on t-shirts with no information or branding, then on 
t-shirts with labor information and lastly to bid on t-shirts with labor information and a brand 
name (Hustvedt & Bernard, 2010). The authors found that the students’ willingness to pay was 
significantly increased when there was given information about labor conditions on the apparel in 
the auctions (Hustvedt & Bernard, 2010).  
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The aim of this review has been to look back on past research to see if we could uncover trends 
or results that are relevant for our thesis. We wanted to see whether past research could shed light 
on what results could be expected from experiment we will be conducting. 
We have explained choice architecture as being any changes of the environment in which people 
make their decisions (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). From studying past experiments it seems that the 
researchers are consistently able to alter people’s attitudes, decision-making process, and 
ultimately behavior, by applying some sort of external stimuli. As we will be testing the effect of 
external stimuli on a decision-making process similar to the ones addressed in the presented 
research, we are hopeful that we could find similar results in our study. 
As mentioned in the introduction to the review of past research, the authors of these articles did 
not use the term “nudging” specifically, but they did, however, use the same principles that were 
put forth by Thaler and Sunstein (2008); they found unrestrictive and cheap methods to change 
the environment in which the test subjects made their decisions. This influence, or nudging of 
behavior, was shown to alter attitudes and behavior in both laboratory experiments and field 
experiments. We are under the impression that the findings could easily be transferable to our 
experiment. 
With our thesis and experiment, we aim to contribute to this growing field of research. We want 
to test nudging in a context where it has not to our knowledge been tested before; influencing 
willingness to pay, in the form of actual payment behavior, were the test subjects answer to a 
privately owned company, not the state. Our goal is to lower the number of young adults that 
default on their bills, serving a sociopolitical purpose as well as the purpose of bettering personal 
finances for individuals.  
2.5.2 The nudges used in our study 
To be able to develop nudges that are appropriate to use for our study, we have looked further 
into the heuristics and biases that we believe may influence payment behavior. We found three 
heuristics and biases that we believe give insights to how we should structure our nudges in text 
format, to be empirically tested in our specific context. The idea was to send out nudges in text 
format with different content to independent groups of test subjects, to investigate whether the 
information conveyed could influence the decision-making process and produce more people to 
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pay their bills within due. Our nudges do not specifically fit either of the nudge categories 
presented by Thaler and Sunstein, but they are developed in the spirit of INcentives, Give 
feedback and Expect error. 
2.5.2.1 Nudging using a common reminder 
We wish to test an additional nudge to the nudges specifically developed according to theory on 
heuristics and biases; a common reminder. By reminding people about the bill, just before it is 
due, we hope that less people will default on their payment purely because they forget the 
upcoming due date. So this nudge, or message, will not contain any additional information 
developed according to theories on heuristics and biases. Research has shown that that reminding 
individuals of upcoming tasks or events significantly increases the probability of it being 
followed through. Calzolari and Nardotto (2011) found that it was possible to increase attendance 
at gymnasiums by up to 25 % by sending out weekly e-mails reminding individuals of the 
possibility to attend the gym. Karlan, McConnell, Mullainathan, and Zinman (2010) found that it 
was possible to increase people’s savings for future expenditures by simply reminding them that 
it would be likely that they would experience higher expenditures in the future than they had at 
the time. 
We believe that a reminder will have a positive effect on reducing default rates. It will be 
especially interesting to observe if there is any difference in effect from sending out a common 
reminder compared to nudges developed according to heuristics and biases. If the messages we 
distribute produce different results, this would indicate the importance of how the nudges are 
coded and formulated in text format. 
We set up the hypotheses to test the relationship between nudging using a common reminder and 
the default rate as follows: 
H0: There is no difference in default rates between the group that receives the common reminder 
and the control group 
HA: The default rate will be lower in the group that receives common reminder compared to the 
control group 
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The following nudges will contain added information to the simple reminder. We expect that by 
adding information based on our knowledge of heuristics and biases, these nudges, or messages, 
will have a greater effect on default rates than the reminder alone. In addition to reminding the 
customer of the upcoming bill, we add incentives to pay the bill within due. 
2.5.2.2 Nudging based on the anchoring-effect 
When people are faced decisions that require that they exercise judgment, one common heuristic 
is to use a given number or sum as an anchor, and adjust their judgments according to this 
number (Kahneman et al., 1982). If you are selling your bike and you know that a friend has sold 
a similar bike for $500, you might decline an offer lower than $500 because you judge it to be too 
low compared to the anchor sum. This is effect is also prevalent regardless of the relevance of the 
number used as the “anchor”. For example, one experiment was performed asking people to 
estimate the percentage of African countries in the UN. Before giving their answer, a wheel of 
fortune containing numbers between 0-100 was spun in the test subjects’ presence. It became 
clear that the number that appeared on the wheel actually influenced their estimates on the 
percentage of African nations in the UN. Participants with higher number on the wheel 
consistently gave estimates that were significantly higher than participants who got low numbers 
on the wheel (Kahneman et al., 1982). When people anchor in numbers that are not arbitrary, i.e. 
that are in fact relevant for the judgement at hand, this effect has shown to be even larger 
(Kahneman et al., 1982). If the anchor is perceived to be relevant to our issue, the anchor may 
significantly affect our final judgement. 
Based on this theory, we wanted to structure a nudge that gave young cell phone customers a 
reference number, in our case the number zero. The message we wanted to send out conveys 
information that the customers will only pay for the actual use of services - the product itself, and 
will face no extra fees or costs given that they pay on time. By anchoring the customers in the 
number zero, i.e. only paying for use, we hope to provide a reference number that will affect the 
judgement on whether or not they pay their bill within the due date. We hope this reference 
number will serve to remind customers that it is only if they pay on time that there are no extra 
costs added to their final bill. 
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We set up the hypotheses to test the relationship between nudging based on the anchoring-effect 
and the default rate as follows: 
H0: There is no difference in default rates between the group that receives the nudge based on the 
anchoring effect and the control group 
HA: The default rate will be lower in the group that receives nudge based on the anchoring effect 
compared to the control group 
2.5.2.3 Nudging based on loss aversion 
In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky introduced a descriptive theory of decision utility called 
“prospect theory”. This theory gives insight as to why people are loss averse. The theory explains 
that the negative feelings an individual experience from a given loss is greater than the positive 
feelings the same person would experience from an equal gain. Most people would perceive the 
loss from losing NOK 100 as much greater than the gain from receiving NOK 100. This is why 
many people would not accept a bet with an equal chance of losing or winning the same amount 
of money, even if the expected value of the bet is zero. Some studies suggest that losses are as 
high as twice as psychologically powerful compared to equal gains. 
This theory inspired us to develop a nudge based on people loss aversion. We formulated a nudge 
were the customer is informed of the minimum charge that is added from defaulting on payment, 
which is NOK 63. NOK 63 is the maximum rate for first-time late-payment fee in Norway, and is 
used as the standard fee in most industries. This sum of money is fairly small and manageable for 
most people when isolated, but prospect theory stipulates that people are loss averse even when it 
comes to smaller sums (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). When made aware of the potential loss 
people might weigh this against potential gains they might achieve from not paying their bill on 
time such as spending their money elsewhere. We expect that people will perceive the potential 
extra cost as worse than any possible gain they may have short-term by defaulting payment. They 
will have to pay the amount owed at some point; postponing payments will only result in greater 
costs. 
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We set up the hypotheses to test the relationship between nudging based on loss aversion and the 
default rate as follows: 
H0: There is no difference in default rates between the group that receives the nudge based on 
loss aversion and the control group 
HA: The default rate will be lower in the group that receives nudge based on loss aversion 
compared to the control group 
2.5.2.4 Nudging based on social norms 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) explain that humans, unlike econs, are biased and rather easily 
influenced by the statements and actions of others. Teenage girls are more likely to become 
pregnant when their friends are having children. This is one of the reasons why one can observe 
“trends” of teenage-pregnancy in certain communities. One can observe the same tendency for 
obesity; if your friends or someone in your family gain weight, it is very likely that you will also 
put on some extra weight. One cannot not exclude other influencing factors that helps explain 
such trends, but it is a fact that humans are heavily influenced by the people around us (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008). Another interesting example can be found in an experiment conducted in 2011 
that looked at the relationship between social norms and energy conservation. In this experiment 
people received energy consumption reports showing the energy consumption of the recipient, 
and also the energy consumption of the neighbouring residents (Allcott, 2011). When people 
were able to track their energy consumption compared to their neighbours, people started to 
change their consumption patterns. For example, the bracket of test subject that originally had the 
highest energy consumption, reduced their consumption by 6,3 % on average. Even the test 
subjects that had the lowest energy consumption before the treatment lowered their energy 
consumption, even though they could have increased their consumption significantly and still 
used less than average. 
Based on such examples, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) stipulate that if a choice architect wants to 
shift the behavior of individuals by the use of nudging, it might be as simple as informing people 
of what others are doing. People tend to look to the actions of others and decide that the action 
taken by the majority is an attractive choice; it is perceived as the correct way to go. People also 
have a wish to be associated with or belong to certain social groups, and therefore adhere to the 
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ruling social norms. Also, it is an easy choice; you don’t have to think about or evaluate your 
options. The risk of this being the wrong choice often has little or no consequences as it is 
socially accepted.  
In the spirit of nudging based on social norms, we developed a nudge that is similar to the nudges 
used in Allcott’s study from 2011, and the experiment performed on tax compliance in Britain in 
2012. We wanted to distribute a text message conveying information about how the majority of 
the cell phone-customers behave; that most people pay on time. Our goal is to investigate 
whether this information may influence the late-payers and ultimately reduce defaults. 
We set up the hypotheses to test the relationship between nudging based on social norms and the 
default rate as follows: 
H0: There is no difference in default rates between the group that receives the nudge based on 
social norms and the control group 
HA: The default rates will be lower in the group that receives nudge based social norms compared 
to the control group 
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Our thesis focuses on a demographic that has shown to have significant difficulties with making 
payments on time, namely young consumers. By performing our experiment the aim is to 
examine whether there is a way to nudge the consumers into paying their bill on time. By altering 
the environment in which they make the decision to pay on time or not, we hope that these 
nudges will have a significant effect. The choice of paying the bill on time or not is neither 
difficult nor rare, but it might be hard to get timely feedback and people might struggle to 
translate the aspects and severity of the situation into something understandable. The choice of 
paying on time might also be a situation in which it is difficult to exercise self-control. One might 
want to forget about the bill and go to the cinema instead. Or maybe the bank account is already 
empty due to previous purchases? We are trying to give people feedback, or incentives to pay 
their bills on time. We believe that this is a relevant and sound context to test different nudges, 
and hopefully find a way to give younger consumers the nudge they need to get their finances in 
order.  
35 
 
3. Methods 
In this section, we move on to the underlying methods for implementing our experiment. 
3.1 The research process 
«Facts do not simply lie around waiting to be picked up. Facts must be carved out of the 
continuous web of ongoing reality, must be observed within a specified frame of 
reference, must be measured with precision, must be observed where they can be related 
to other relevant facts. All of this involves methods» (Rose and Peterson, cited in Ghauri 
& Grønhaug, 2010, p.3) 
Drawing on the above statement, Ghauri and Grønhaug (2010) describe research as a systematic 
quest to find truth or answers, altering or extending existing knowledge. All research stems from 
the existence of something we want to gain more knowledge about. Curiosity could therefore be 
viewed as the driving force underlying all research and investigation. 
Zikmund, Babin, Carr, and Griffin (2010) describe two types of research based on the purpose of 
the study; applied business research and basic business research. Applied business research is 
used to address a specific business decision for a particular firm, while basic business research is 
used as an attempt to alter or expand existing theory or phenomena, without aiming to solve a 
specific problem (Zikmund et al., 2010). The two are not entirely separable, however, as basic 
research is often the basis for later applied research (Zikmund et al., 2010). One common 
denominator for both types is the systematic use of scientific method.  This is when we use 
knowledge and evidence to draw objective conclusions (Zikmund et al., 2010). For this thesis, we 
are performing basic business research as the basis for later applied research internally in the 
collaborating firm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Figure 3.1: A summary of the scientific method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Zikmund et al., 2010, p.7)  
The research process consists of a series of activities undertaken over time. Figure 3.1 outlines 
the basic steps of the process. There are several ways to develop ideas for further research, which 
will depend on what we already know and/or what we can observe in real life. We reach the 
hypothesis stage when we have transformed these ideas into researchable terms. The next step is 
to test hypothesis against facts or data, resulting in either verifying or rejecting the hypothesis. 
From this we extract new knowledge in the form of conclusions (Zikmund et al., 2010). 
All research will follow a set of phases. In each of these phases choices are made that will affect 
the following phases and the final validity and reliability of the results. In this section, we will 
discuss the initial phases of the research process, while leaving the analysis and conclusions to 
following chapters. 
3.2 Problem definition 
A concept describes a phenomenon and represents the building blocks of theory; it is an 
abstraction of reality that is the basic unit for theory development (Zikmund et al., 2010).  We 
will be looking at the concept of “nudging” attitudes and behavior. To clarify our concept we 
have defined a nudge to be «anything that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without 
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives» (Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008, p.6). The treatments used in the experiment do not limit any options for the customer and 
can easily be avoided. This is in accordance with the theoretical foundation for this thesis. 
Prior 
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The content of a problem definition can be divided into three parts (Jacobsen, 2005). First, we 
need to define the units we wish to examine. We must then define how to measure the 
phenomena we wish to investigate. This is done by the use of variables. We expect the units to 
have different values of the variables. Lastly, we must decide the context of the study. That is, the 
specific setting and circumstances of the study (Jacobsen, 2005). In our case we will be looking 
at the current cell phone customers of One Call, aged 18-30, measuring the effect of nudging on 
payment rates collected from January through March of 2013. 
Figure 3.2: The content of a problem definition 
 
 (Source: Jacobsen, 2005, p.70) 
Based on the above definition, we have defined our problem as follows: 
We wish to describe if and, subsequently, how the use of nudging may affect the propensity to 
default on bill payments, i.e. the customers’ choice to pay bills within due date. By looking at 
One Call’s customer base aged 18-30, in January through March of 2013, we will test whether 
nudging may reduce default rates accounted for by this age group. 
3.2.1 Hypotheses 
A hypothesis is according to Zikmund et al. (2010) defined as a statement that expresses the 
relationship between two variables, which can be tested empirically. Based on the our research 
question, we formulate this problem definition into researchable hypotheses to be empirically 
tested; 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
Units 
Values 
Context 
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H0: No difference in default rates in treatment group measured against the control group  
for m = F, M  
H0: µC = µi  for m = F, M 
and 
HA: Default rates are lower in treatment group measured against the control group  
for m = F, M 
HA: µC > µi  for m = F, M 
i = {1,4} : treatment groups = 1: reminder, 2: anchoring, 3: loss aversion and 4: social norms. 
C = control group 
m = month = F: February, M: March 
We will measure and test all groups separately against the control group of the corresponding 
month. The hypotheses will be the same, using the different denotes stipulated above. We thereby 
test the effect of the different types of messages in the month of treatment, as well as 
investigating any longer term effects in the following month. 
To test the hypotheses, we need to set up a conceptual framework for the study. Any conceptual 
framework contains a dependent variable and at least one independent variable (Zikmund et al., 
2010). The dependent variable represents the phenomenon we want to study, that is to be 
predicted or explained, while the independent variable represents the factor assumed to predict or 
explain the dependent variable. Control variables are used in empirical research to reduce the risk 
of attributing explanatory properties to independent variables that in fact are not responsible for 
the variation in the dependent variable (Zikmund et al., 2010). The control variable is used to test 
the possibility that an empirical observed relation between an independent variable and a 
dependent variable is spurious. A spurious relation is a relation that can be explained by other 
variables (Andersen, 2012).  
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We have four independent treatments, being our nudges. These are expected to influence the 
default rate for each group. We introduce a control group to control for any spurious relationships 
(e.g. history or seasonal effects). This is a group that will not receive any treatment, and we 
therefore hope that this group will capture any variation in the dependent variable that cannot be 
explained by our nudges. We expect that the variation found in the default rates from each group 
can be explained by our independent variable. 
3.3 Unit selection 
When we select our units for analysis, we can either choose to gather information from each 
member of the population or to select a representative sample and generalize the findings to the 
larger population (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2010). In the context of our thesis, based on studies and 
statistics as presented in the previous chapter, and on request from our collaborating firm, the 
units of interest are limited to cellphone customers in the age 18-30 in Norway. All these 
customers make up our theoretical population. We do not have the appropriate resources to 
investigate all the units of the theoretical population. Our actual population is therefore limited to 
One Call’s customers in this age group. We opted to investigate a sample and generalize the 
findings to count for the total population.  
Due to costs and possible ripple effects throughout the organization, One Call made 2500 units 
available for us to investigate. These were divided into five groups of 500 units, four of which 
received different text messages, and one was held constant as a control group to eliminate 
effects of unknown factors. The 2500 were selected from one of three batches of their customers, 
according to due date of payment. The top 2500 on this list were selected. None of these 
customers were reported to have changed cell phone provider during the experiment, making our 
sample size constant throughout the experiment. The list of customers was not structured 
according to any parameters (Per Ola Stålberg, Customer Developer at One Call, e-mail received 
27.02.2013). Since the subjects in our sample have not been selected according to any criteria 
other than the age demographic, we can assume that we have a randomized sample which is 
representative for the theoretical population. 
3.4 Research design 
The research design is the overall plan of the methods and procedures for collecting and analysis 
of data. The research design will therefore provide a plan of action for the research process. As 
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several research designs may accomplish the same objectives of a study, the researcher chooses 
design type according to the appropriateness of each type (Zikmund et al., 2010). This will in turn 
depend on the objectives of the study, time constraints, the available data sources, the urgency of 
results, the cost of obtaining data, and assessment of validity and reliability (Zikmund et al., 
2010). It is argued that there is no single best research design. However, a specific design type 
will be more appropriate to use in certain situations than in others. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether one can find significant effects from nudging 
customers on their propensity to default bill payments. Therefore it is appropriate to use causal 
research design. The causal research design is used when we want to explain how events are 
related; it seeks to find cause-effect relationships (Jacobsen, 2005). In science, this is defined as 
following: «If X occurs, Y will always happen» (Jacobsen, 2005). Social science has modified 
this relationship, stating that if A occurs, there is an x % probability that B should occur 
(Jacobsen, 2005). This requirement is less strict, indicating that a certain degree of regularity 
rather than absolute correlation is viewed as satisfying. When using this requirement for 
causality, it is common to operate with three conditions that a study must satisfy in order to make 
any statements about the causality of a phenomenon (Jacobsen, 2005):  
1. Concomitant variation: 
There must be a correlation between what we assume is the cause and what we assume is the 
effect, meaning that the two events vary systematically.  
2. Temporal sequence: 
Cause must precede effect in time.  That is, there must be temporal proximity between cause and 
effect.  
3. Nonspurious association:  
The effect must be truly be caused by what we assume is the cause, rather than being due to some 
other variable. 
In addition to these three requirements to judge the causality of a phenomenon, most authors on 
scientific methods discuss the support of existing theory and research as being important, as well 
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as other relevant factors and specific conditions that may affect the study. This must also be taken 
into consideration when assessing the causality of a study. 
We wish to use an experiment as our source of data collection. An experiment is «a carefully 
controlled study in which the researcher manipulates a proposed cause and observes any 
corresponding change in the proposed effect» (Zikmund et al., 2010, p.59). Instead of trying to 
discover all factors that affect propensity to default payments, we have based our design on the 
idea that we wish to eliminate all other factors, both known and unknown – only focusing on the 
effect of nudging. This is the underlying idea of performing experiments (Jacobsen, 2005). 
Figure 3.3: Overview of factors that affect propensity to default payments  
 
(Based on Jacobsen, 2005, p.111) 
The causal ideal is the classic experiment (Zikmund et al., 2010). This design contains four key 
elements (Jacobsen, 2005): 
1. Comparison 
This means that we compare changes in the group that has been subjected to the experimental 
variable with the changes that have occurred in a control group that has not been subjected to the 
same experiment. 
2. Randomization or random selection of units in the compared groups 
By randomly drawing the groups to be compared, we hedge against systematic differences 
between the groups. Thereby we assume that the groups can be directly compared. 
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3. Time laps data 
This means that we register the conditions before the experiment is performed and a similar 
(preferably identical) registration of the conditions some time after the experiment was 
performed. 
4. Active manipulation 
This means that the researcher deliberately manipulates the relationship that is believed to be a 
possible cause. This relationship is only manipulated within the experimental group, and not in 
the control group. 
Our experiment contains all these elements, as will be further elaborated on in the continuation of 
this section. 
Our experiment can be portrayed as follows:  
Figure 3.4: Overview of the experiment 
 
(Based on Jacobsen, 2005, p.113) 
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In addition to the two times for measurement as shown in the figure we have also estimated, 
based on total default rates, the expected default rates for each group in January. This represents a 
measurement for comparison. 
The effect of each nudge is calculated as follows: 
Experiment Group i – Control Group = the effect of nudging  for i = {1,4} and m = F,M 
The model and calculations show that we have satisfied all three conditions for causality.  
3.5 Method for data collection 
We have chosen a quantitative research design, as the focus is on the objective facts of a 
particular phenomenon and is intended to test, verify and extend existing knowledge by testing 
hypotheses (Zikmund et al., 2010). Quantitative method provides and analyses empirical data in 
the form of numbers and statistics, and is mostly used when the study aims to describe the extent 
or frequency of a phenomenon (Zikmund et al., 2010). The main advantage of using this 
approach is that the information is standardized and is fairly easy to process and analyze by the 
use of computer programs. Further, the quantitative approach to data collection is usually less 
costly than qualitative method, which means that we can get many respondents; thereby being 
able to get a representative sample of the population. From this, we are better able to generalize 
the findings to count for a larger population (Zikmund et al., 2010). This approach also limits the 
study by setting a clear finish line in regards to data collection. A disadvantage of using this 
approach is that we risk getting a superficial study, overlooking underlying factors of why we get 
the specific data. As we will not interview or assess anybody in our sample, it will be difficult to 
make any assessment of why we see changes or not. Also, we will not register data at an 
individual level, so we cannot be track one individual’s response over time; we are only looking 
at default rates on an aggregated group level. Another disadvantage is that the researcher has 
already defined the relevant topics ahead of executing the study, not allowing for any additional 
factors that might be relevant for the study (Zikmund et al., 2010). 
By performing the experiment, we will be gathering primary data. The main advantage by getting 
primary data is that the data is collected for this particular study, eliminating “noise” from 
sources having different objectives than ours. The main disadvantage is that it may be difficult to 
access; collecting primary data can be time consuming and increase costs. The researcher is also 
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depending on the willingness and ability of respondents to answer truthfully and actually reading 
the messages or surveys you send out (Zikmund et al., 2010). As we are sending our nudges via 
text message, we are convinced that we will eliminate most issues related to non-response. In our 
first meeting with One Call we were informed that in their experience, few of their customers 
read e-mails or attachments sent by the company. By using such methods, we would face 
problems with estimating how many actually read the messages. Text messages on cell phones, 
however, are difficult to ignore as the message pops up on the screen without even opening the 
message in full. By sending out our text messages, we expect the non-response rate in our sample 
to be close to zero. 
3.6 Procedure 
When starting this project we first focused our efforts on finding a company to collaborate with. 
Without having a collaborating company, and access to its customer base, this project would not 
be possible to execute. So the first thing we did was to properly formulate what we aimed to do in 
understandable terms for a firm that might not be familiar with this field of research and our 
methods for performing such an experiment. We also made a proposal for a progress schedule; 
how we wanted to proceed and what we needed from the firm at each stage of the process to 
finish on time. In order to secure that the firm would also get an understanding of the actual 
treatment, we also formed a suggestion for how we wanted to formulate the messages. These 
three information sheets made up our “pitch” towards the company: the initial information to 
send out in hopes of sparking an interest. 
We targeted the executives of customer-relations and communication in the companies we 
approached. Our pitch was sent out to several companies in the cellular industry, based on e-mail 
addresses either found online or given to us by customer service. The primary reason for looking 
at Norwegian cellular industry is that it generally has significant default rates with much room for 
improvement at an individual level. A significant portion of the defaulted bills is accounted for 
by young adults under 30 years of age. Also, due to time constraints of our project, this is an 
industry where it would be possible to conduct the designed experiment with rapid and possibly 
significant results. We got positive feedback from two companies, and after a few rounds of e-
mailing back and forward we decided that One Call was the firm we wanted to proceed with. 
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They invited us to come to their headquarters in Oslo to meet and further discuss the 
implementation. 
Before we met with One Call we conducted a small pre-test in the University cafeteria to verify 
that we were on to something. This was important both to verify that the coding of the messages 
was perceived as intended and that there was potential for the expected response. We handed out 
the different versions of the messages, as proposed in the initial contact towards the company, to 
25 randomly chosen students in the cafeteria. After giving them the time to read through the 
messages, we asked them to give their comments and thoughts. Most of them thought that all the 
nudges would have an impact on their payment behavior, given that they did not pay their bills 
promptly. However, most of them stated that this was not an issue for them as they did in fact pay 
their bills on time. The respondents generally chose nudging based on social norms as the most 
likely to give the desired effect, so long as it was tastefully formulated not to offend the customer. 
The common reminder was perceived to be the second most effective message to alter behavior. 
There were also some respondents that did not believe these messages would have any effect at 
all. We presented the results of this pre-test to One Call, to indicate what response could be 
expected. 
In our meeting with One Call we spent most of the time clarifying questions from both sides of 
the table regarding the implementation of the experiment. We agreed that One Call would handle 
the division of groups, recording the data and reporting to us; all according to our instructions. 
Because of the travelling distance from Kristiansand to Oslo, we agreed that we would continue 
communicating via e-mail and phone, and we were assigned a specific contact person to handle 
this communication. 
The instructions given to One Call during this meeting were as follows: 
- Separate the customers aged 18-30 from the rest of the customer base. 
- From this group, randomly select five groups for us to use in the experiment. 
- Send out each of the nudges by text message to one random group, four in total, while 
leaving one group “as is”. This should be done three days before due date. 
- When payments are in for February’s bill; register how many paid within due for each of 
the groups. 
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- Also record how many customers that pays within due in March for each of the groups. 
- Report to us as soon as possible for analysis. 
In addition to this, we asked them to extract information from their data systems concerning the 
total default rates from the selected demographic from January through March of the previous 
year. This was for the purpose of comparing any possible results with the same time period from 
2012. 
The representatives from One Call were very enthusiastic about our project as it fitted right into 
their current plans. The cell phone industry was already working closely with the Norwegian 
Consumer Ombudsman concerning the issue of young adults defaulting on bill payments. One 
Call has a clear overrepresentation of younger customers, and wanted to use the findings of our 
thesis as basis when deciding on the implementation of permanent, long-term measures to 
increase awareness of payment and payment punctuality among young debtors.  
We wanted to test nudging according to relevant theory. A theory is defined by Ghauri and 
Grønhaug (2010) as «a set of interrelated concepts, definitions and propositions that present a 
systematic view of specifying relations among variables with the purpose of explaining and 
predicting phenomena» (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2010, p.37). In the following communication with 
One Call, we collaborated closely to properly formulate the messages that were to be sent out. 
After some discussion, we decided to move forward with the following text messages: 
Common reminder: 
This message did not contain any information beyond a simple reminder, only that there was an 
upcoming invoice to be paid. This information is also included in the other text messages, to 
make them as similar as possible. Thereby we can more correctly separate the different effects 
from the additional information. 
«Hei. Vi minner om at denne måneds faktura har forfallsdato XX.02.2013. Du finner kopi av din 
faktura på Mine Sider på www.onecall.no. Ha en fin dag! Hilsen One Call» 
Message based on the anchoring-effect: 
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By emphasizing the number zero, we hope to anchor the customers’ attention in this particular 
number. It is somewhat similar to the loss aversion-nudge but the effects on decision-making 
mechanisms are different. By anchoring in the number 0, we aim to make this the default for the 
customer, and subsequently that the customer will be reluctant to make decisions that would alter 
the current situation. 
«Hei. Vi minner om at denne måneds faktura har forfallsdato XX.02.2013. Betaler du til 
forfall, får du kr 0 i gebyrer som kan komme ved for sen betaling. Du betaler da kun for ditt 
abonnement og forbruk. Du finner kopi av din faktura på Mine Sider på www.onecall.no. Ha en 
fin dag! Hilsen One Call» 
Message based on loss aversion: 
As people tend to experience a given loss as much worse than the good of gaining the equivalent 
sum of money, the aim is here to focus on a potential loss. The message is trying to convince the 
customer that they do not stand to gain anything by paying their bill on time, but they will avoid 
the extra loss represented by a late-payment fee.  
«Hei. Vi minner om at denne måneds faktura har forfallsdato XX.02.2013. Ved å betale denne til 
forfall, unngår du purring på 63kr. Du finner kopi av din faktura på Mine Sider 
på www.onecall.no. Ha en fin dag! Hilsen One Call» 
Message based on social norms: 
In accordance with the theory on social nudging, we developed a message that plays on 
customers’ social conscience or adhere to social norms. Most people will seek to be just as 
“good” as everyone else, and avoid sticking out from the group in a negative manner. They might 
want to be a part of a group that adheres to the same social norms (e.g. paying what you owe on 
time), or they might think they should act like the majority as this can serve as guidelines for 
what is normal or “smart”.   
«Hei. De fleste av våre kunder betaler sin faktura innen forfall og det setter vi stor pris på. Vi 
minner om at denne måneds faktura har forfallsdato XX.02.2013. Du finner kopi av din faktura 
på Mine Sider på www.onecall.no. Ha en fin dag! Hilsen One Call» 
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These text messages represent the different types of nudges that were sent out to our sample of 
customers. They have been developed according to theory, meaning that they are in accordance 
with requirements to count as a mere nudge as explained in the theory. Later they have been 
customized to fit One Call’s “tone of voice” towards their customers. The wording is meant to be 
as similar as possible to extract the pure effect of different information while eliminating 
redundant “noise”. In addition to the four groups, we also kept one control group to separate the 
effect of the nudges from the effect of any other unknown factors. 
The experiment was carried out as follows: Text messages were sent to the four treatment groups 
three days before due date on February’s bill. We chose to send out the text messages relatively 
close to due date so that customers would not forget the message, but not so close that the effect 
could not be observed. A couple of days after the due date, One Call registered how many 
customers in each group had paid on time or not. They also recorded payment rate from the 
control group with the same number of subjects as the treatment groups. Those who had not paid 
would receive a late-payment reminder with an additional fee. One Call also kept track of the 
sample groups’ payments in March, so that we could see if the effect of nudging was also 
prevalent in the following month. After collecting all the data, One Call sent us the primary data 
for us to analyze. 
We have had some challenges with communication during the process. We have to acknowledge 
that we might have underestimated the importance of being specific. In the spirit of being polite, 
we might have caused our fair share of confusion and misguidance. Also, it proved challenging to 
explain something we know so well to someone who knows so little about it. Adding to this, we 
had to deal with several contacts within the organization that all had different levels of 
knowledge about our project.  
We did not have direct contact with the system administrator who was responsible for the actual 
data collection. So the communication process itself consisted of a number of links, all subject to 
cause confusion. This added to the time span of catching miscommunication in the process and 
resolving any confusion. 
We first received a set of data from all months requested, where the records seemed to be in 
accordance with what we had initially expected. But the data from March seemed to be off. All 
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the data collected from March showed a remarkable lower level of defaults compared to any of 
the other months from which we had received data. One would expect that the messages would 
have had the most influence on February’s default rate, and then a slight default increase in 
March – maybe even close to the default rate for the entire customer base. The default rate from 
the control group in March showed only a fraction of the total default rate. This made us nervous 
that something had gone wrong in the data collection process, as they should be quite similar, and 
made us question whether all the data received was in fact incorrect. After much correspondence 
back and forward we managed to locate the mistake that had been made, and finally received an 
updated and correct data set. After this, we also contacted a third person in the organization to 
check the data independently. This was done to ensure that the data were correct and collected 
according to the instructions given. 
3.8 Reliability and Validity 
Reliability refers to the stability of the measure, being an indicator of internal consistency 
(Zikmund et al., 2010). A measurement is reliable when several attempts to measure the same 
phenomenon converges on the same result (Zikmund et al., 2010). You would expect that if you 
measured an individual according to one variable five times, you would get the same result every 
time. Reliability is all about consistency, or the consistency of measurement. If the measurements 
lack reliability, we tend to get inconsistent measurements resulting in false or spurious findings 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Zikmund et al., 2010). We therefore need to secure that the 
measurement process is performed without error.  
We distributed our text messages containing nudges only once; just before due date in February 
of 2013. Then, we collected data concerning actual payment ratios for January, February and 
March for both 2012 and 2013. By doing this, we were able to record the isolated effect of the 
treatments, and compare the results to the default rates from one year ago. Our unit of 
measurement was straight-forward; do the customers pay on time or not. One Call has accurate 
tracking systems and software, making it easy to register and extract data on the portion of 
defaulted payments from our sample. As we have not had the opportunity or the resources to go 
through the data ourselves, we rely on the accuracy of reports from our contact person in One 
Call. This means that for the time span we are gathering data from, we accurately measure the 
percentage that did or did not pay on time - every time.  Therefore, we stipulate that our 
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experiment and our thesis have strong reliability and that we will not encounter problems related 
to inconsistent measurements. 
Validity is the extent to which a score truly represents a concept (Zikmund et al., 2010). 
Internal validity exists only if the independent variable is in fact responsible for the variance in 
the dependent variable (Zikmund et al., 2010). In other words, do we really measure what we 
intended to measure? If the findings were influenced or confounded by other factors, the 
conclusions made based on the study might not be valid. In this study we have clearly defined 
what it is we want to measure. As we have collected primary data, there is little room for “noise” 
to interfere with what we have actually measured. We used a control group to check that we 
measured the effect of our nudges specifically, separating the effect from other factors and 
spurious relations. We are therefore confident that the internal validity of our experiment is 
satisfying. 
External validity is the accuracy to which the findings may be generalized beyond the specific 
study (Zikmund et al., 2010). If the experiment was performed by using a different sample or 
population, would the results be the same? In our study we have investigated a randomized 
sample from One Call’s customer base aged 18-30. Based on the method of selection, we firmly 
believe that our findings can be generalized to this larger group of people with solid external 
validity. The results are primarily valid to count for the Norwegian cellular industry, on the given 
age demographic. The question remains whether we can generalize the results to count for other 
age groups, other industries, and outside the national borders of Norway. 
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4. Data analysis 
In this section we present and analyze the data material collected during our experiment. 
4.1 Results 
On the next page is a table presenting the raw data material. Our primary data was collected from 
January through March of this year, 2013. From this year we collected both total default rates 
within the selected age demographic and specific default rates in our treatment groups and the 
control group, from each month. Ideally, we would also have benefited from having data from 
April of this year, to further establish any possible longer term effects. As this was not part of the 
initial agreement with One Call, these data have not been registered and we have therefore not 
been able to get hold of them. We did, however, acquire total default rates from January through 
March of 2012 as added information to the findings from this year, adding to the discussion of 
our findings.  
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Table 4.1: Original data 
Customers aged 18-30         
  Total Non-default Default Default rate 
  
   
  
January of 2012 50650 47023 3627 7,161 % 
February of 2012 51124 47530 3594 7,030 % 
March of 2012 53196 48604 4592 8,632 % 
  
   
  
January of 2013 82292 74322 7970 9,685 % 
  
   
  
January 2013 estimated: Reminder 500 452 48 9,685 % 
January 2013 estimated: Anchoring 500 452 48 9,685 % 
January 2013 estimated: Loss aversion 500 452 48 9,685 % 
January 2013 estimated: Social norms 500 452 48 9,685 % 
January 2013 estimated: Control group 500 452 48 9,685 % 
  2500 2258 242 9,685 % 
  
   
  
February of 2013 86486 78240 8246 9,534 % 
  
   
  
February 2013: Reminder 500 482 18 3,600 % 
February 2013: Anchoring 500 472 28 5,600 % 
February 2013: Loss aversion 500 465 35 7,000 % 
February 2013: Social norms 500 436 64 12,800 % 
February 2013: Control group 500 445 55 11,000 % 
  2500 2300 200   
  
   
  
March of 2013  88060 77469 10591 12,027 % 
  
   
  
March 2013: Reminder 500 464 36 7,200 % 
March 2013: Anchoring 500 435 65 13,000 % 
March 2013: Loss aversion 500 449 51 10,200 % 
March 2013: Social norms 500 429 71 14,200 % 
March 2013: Control group 500 437 63 12,600 % 
  2500 2214 286   
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January through March of 2012 
In January 2012 the default rate in the total customer base ranged 18-30 year old, was 7,16 %. In 
February 2012 the default rate was slightly reduced to 7,03 %. In March the default rate was 8,63 
%, which is a noticeable increase from the two previous months.  
January of 2013 
In January of 2013 the default rate for the total customer base between 18-30 years of age was 
9,69 %. Since our project had not yet started at this point in time, One Call did not register the 
specific default rates of our treatment groups at this stage. However, since our sample is assumed 
to be fully randomized and has not received any treatment in January, we estimated that the 
default rate in each group could be expected to be the same as for the total demographic, namely 
9,69 % for each group of 500 units. 
February of 2013 
In February our sample groups were subjected to treatments, making this month the first point in 
time where we could record any possible effects of our experiment. The total default rate in our 
chosen age demographic was 9,53 %, while the control group of 500 units had a default rate of 11 
%. In the sample group that received only a reminder, only 3,60 % defaulted their bill payment. 
In the group that received the message based on the anchoring-effect, 5,60 % defaulted. The 
group that received the message based on loss aversion had a default rate of 7,00 %. All of these 
were lower than the default rates in both the total demographic and our appointed control group. 
Interestingly, the group that received the message based on social norms had a default rate of 
12,80 %, ranging higher than the total default rate and the recorded default rate in the control 
group in this month. 
March of 2013 
We also recorded whether the treatments could have an effect on the default rates in the 
following month, supporting a possible longer term effect, without subjecting the groups to a new 
series of treatments. In March the default rate for the total demographic was 12,03 %, while the 
control group had a default rate of 12,60 %. Both of these showed a slight increase from 
February. One would therefore expect all the treatment groups to have slightly increased default 
rates. We found that the group that received only the reminder had a default rate of only 7,20 %, 
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almost half the default rate recorded for the control group. The other groups showed default rates 
that are more in line with what one would expect; The group that received the message based on 
the anchoring-effect had a default rate of 13,00 %, the group that received the message based on 
loss aversion had a default rate of 10,20 %, and the group that received the message based on 
social norms had a default rate of 14,20 %. All of these rate noticeably higher than in the 
previous month. 
2012 compared to 2013 
During the last year, One Call has recorded a general increase in total default rates. There was 
also a substancial increase in the total customer base aged 18-30. Based on the data material, we 
were also able to spot possible seasonable fluctations; in both years March had a noticeble higher 
default rate than in the previous two months of the year. 
4.2 Analysis 
The aim of our experiment is to investigate whether nudging may reduce the number of young 
cell phone customers that default on their bill payments. As we have reported the data collected 
in the above section, we will now move on to the analysis. While there are several ways to 
analyze quantitative data, we have chosen to use descriptive methods supported by statistical 
methods for testing our hypotheses. This is sufficient to establish any relationships between the 
nudges and the default rates, as our original data is fairly straight-forward in nature. 
The analysis is based on calculations performed using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences). The results from our original calculations can be found in the appendix. 
4.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are used to describe the basic characteristics of a data collection. We cannot 
draw any conclusions beyond what can actually be observed from the data material, as the aim is 
only to describe and structure the main content of our data. 
In this paragraph we summarize the findings within our sample groups. Measures of central 
tendency and measures of variability are summarized in table 4.2 and table 4.4, representing 
measures from February and March of 2013, respectively. The differences between the groups 
can easily be observed when the data is displayed graphically, as shown in figure 4.1 and figure 
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4.2, corresponding to the aforementioned tables. We have further set up tables telling the 
percentage difference between each treatment group compared to the control group of the 
corresponding month. 
February 
Table 4.2: Summary of measures, February 2013 
Treatment group:  Reminder Anchoring Loss aversion Social norms Control group 
Sample size 500 500 500 500 500 
Mean 0,036 0,056 0,070 0,128 0,110 
Variance 0,035 0,053 0,065 0,112 0,098 
Standard deviation 0,186 0,230 0,255 0,334 0,313 
 
These are the measures used when performing the independent samples t-test for February to 
verify or reject our null hypotheses in the following paragraph. We observe the differences in 
means and variances between the groups. 
Figure 4.1 displays the differences in default rates between subject groups in February. The 
separate bars indicating default rates for each group show a noticeable reduction in default rates 
in three of the four treatment groups; the group that received the common reminder, the group 
that received the message based on the anchoring-effect, and the group that received the message 
based on loss aversion. In the last treatment group, that received a message based on social 
norms, the nudge seems to have had the opposite effect of what we expected. The default rate in 
this particular group is higher than in any of the other groups, including the control group. This 
indicates that not only did we not get the desired effect, but the effect recorded was worse than 
what could be expected if the group was not subjected to any treatment.  
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Figure 4.1: Default rates in February, 2013  
 
In table 4.3 we have calculated the percentage difference between each treatment group and the 
control group. The default rate in the control group was approximately three times the default rate 
found in the group that received a reminder, about twice as large as the group that received the 
anchoring-nudge, and 57 % larger than the default rate in the group that received the loss 
aversion-nudge. These numbers suggest that the three aforementioned nudges did in fact 
influence people’s actual behavior, and reduced the number of defaults. The effect of nudging 
based on social norms is an interesting finding. The default rate is actually 16,36 % higher in this 
group compared to the control group.  
Table 4.3: Percentage difference in each treatment group measured against the control group, 
February 2013 
Treatment group: Reminder Anchoring Loss aversion Social norms 
% difference compared to 
the control group 
(-205 %) (-96,43 %) (-57,14 %) 16,36 % 
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March 
We also wanted to check whether the effects of nudging in February could transfer beyond the 
initial treatment period. To test this, we also recorded data from the sample groups in March. By 
doing this we are able to compare the results between the two time periods, and determine 
whether the effect is indicated to be prominent on a longer term basis.  
 
Table 4.4: Summary of measures, March 2013 
Treatment group:  Reminder Anchoring Loss aversion Social norms Control group 
Sample size 500 500 500 500 500 
Mean 0,072 0,122 0,094 0,142 0,126 
Variance 0,067 0,107 0,085 0,122 0,110 
Standard deviation 0,259 0,328 0,292 0,349 0,332 
 
These are the measures used when performing the independent samples t-test for March to verify 
or reject our null hypotheses in the following paragraph. We observe the differences in means 
and variances between the groups.  
Figure 4.2 displays the differences in default rates between the subject groups in March. From 
this graph it seems that it is the reminder and the nudge based on loss aversion that could have a 
longer lasting effect, with noticeable lower default rates than the control group. The other sample 
groups seem to be somewhat returning to a normal state with default rates that are similar to the 
control group.  
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Figure 4.2: Default rates in March, 2013 
 
From the calculations presented in table 4.5, it seems that neither the message based on the 
anchoring-effect nor the message based on loss aversion has a significant effect in the month 
following the initial treatment. These smaller differences from the control group might be 
explained simply by natural variations. It is interesting, however, that the group that received the 
message based on social norms, still has a default rate that is higher than the control group. It 
might not be of significance, but it is still interesting that this deviation from our expectations 
would be prominent in the month following the treatment period.  
Table 4.5: Percentage difference in each treatment group measured against the control group, 
March 2013 
Treatment group: Reminder Anchoring Loss aversion Social norms 
% difference compared 
to the control group 
(-75 %) 3,1 % (-23, 5 %) 12,7 % 
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4.2.2 Hypothesis testing 
Our hypotheses reflect our problem definition; we wish to examine if either of the messages will 
reduce default rates to be significantly lower in the nudged groups compared to the control group. 
To determine if our findings support our assumptions, we test the hypotheses to conclude whether 
we can reject the null hypotheses we have put forward. 
The most commonly used procedure for testing hypotheses requires that we directly test our null 
hypothesis, to conclude that we can either reject or fail to reject our null hypothesis (Triola, 
2011). Based on the data material we have gathered we will conduct statistical tests to uncover if 
the groups that received nudges have significantly lower default rates than the control group of 
the corresponding month. We use these statistical methods to support our descriptive analysis as 
presented above, and draw final conclusions. By using statistical methods to test our hypotheses 
we may uncover information and results that may not be intuitive by simply describing the data 
collected. 
When we conduct a hypothesis tests we are at risk of making two types of errors. We may reject 
a null hypothesis that is actually correct, which is called an error of the first kind. The other 
mistake is failing to reject a null hypothesis that is false, which is called an error of the second 
kind. The probability of rejecting a true null hypothesis is denoted as the significance level. We 
test our hypotheses on a significance level α = 0,05, which means that we can expect to reject the 
null hypothesis in 5 % of the instances where it is actually correct. Another way of looking at this 
is to say that we will correctly reject the null hypothesis with 95 % certainty (Triola, 2011). 
The T-test 
A t-test is a statistical test that can be used to determine if the means of two sets of data are 
significantly different from each other (Triola, 2011). We want to test whether or not the results 
from each of the nudged groups are significantly different from the control group, for each month 
of collected data. We use the independent samples t-test, as our sample groups are separate sets 
of independent and identically distributed samples, with different variances (Triola, 2011). When 
looking for a possible prolonged effect, we use a paired samples t-test because we are measuring 
the same treatment group in two different time periods. This test will be used to prove whether or 
not the results found in the month of treatment are directly transferred to the following month. If 
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we find is a significant difference between the results from a treatment group in February and the 
results from the same group in March, we cannot claim that the effect of the treatment is directly 
transferable to the next month.  
Due to the nature of our research question and hypotheses, we test our hypotheses in one 
direction when performing the independent samples t-test. We wish to examine whether nudging 
may have reduced defaulted payments, and test if the default rates in the nudged groups are 
significantly lower than in the corresponding control group. Therefore we have chosen to do a 
one-tailed t-test, so we are testing for a relationship in one direction (Triola, 2011). The 
independent t-tests will be structured as followed:  
Null hypothesis: H0: µ1 = µ2 
Alternative hypothesis: HA: µ1 > µ2 
Test statistic:  
     
√
   
  
 
   
  
 
Data: We have n1 = n2 for observations of x1 and x2. In our case x1 is the observed default rate in 
the group that did not received treatment, and x2 is the observation of the default rate in the group 
that did received treatment. 
The results from performing the t-test is measured against significance level α to see if there are 
significant differences between the two groups, and by measuring the test statistic against a 
critical t-value to determine whether or not we are able to reject H0. 
Conclusions that can be drawn on the basis of this test:   Reject H0 if:  | t | > tα or p < 2α 
                               Reject H0 if: t < - tα or p < α 
                              Reject H0 if: t > + tα or p < α 
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T-test localization 
H0: µC = µi No difference in default rates in treatment group compared to control group 
HA: µC > µi  The default rate is lower in treatment group measured against the control group 
i = {1,4} 
for m = F, M 
This is the general hypothesis that will be used to test four different treatment groups, in two 
different time periods, meaning that we will perform a t-test for each treatment group in each 
month from which we have collected data. The H0 and HA will be the same for each separate 
treatment group. 
We can make inferences about our hypotheses by looking to p-values and test statistics, measured 
against the significance level and the critical t-value. The critical t-value that we will measure our 
test statistic against is found by using a t-distribution table. The critical t-value is calculated on 
the basis of the selected significance level, and the degrees of freedom in our samples. SPSS only 
has the option of conducting a two-tailed independent samples t-test. Results from a two-tailed 
test are measured against different critical t-values than one-tailed tests. The critical t-value we 
have used has therefore been found using a t-distribution table. We have selected to test our 
hypotheses in one direction, at a significance level α = 0, 05 and our samples have 500 (or 500 - 1 
= 499) degrees of freedom. This provides us with a critical t-value (tα) of 1,648. 
Testing our findings from February 
Table 4.6 summarizes the t-values and p-values found by conducting a t-test between each 
treatment group and the control group in February.  
Table 4.6: Results from t-test between treatment groups and control group, February 2013 
 T-value p-value 
T-test Reminder vs Control -4,539 < -tα P < 0,001 < α0,05 
T-test Anchoring vs Control -3,017 < -tα P = 0,002 < α0,05 
T-test Loss aversion vs Control -2,213 < -tα P = 0,027 < α0,05 
T-test Social norms vs Control 0,878  > -tα P = 0,38 > α0,05 
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From the information conveyed in this table, we are able to make inferences on whether or not 
we can reject our null hypotheses for February. 
We see that for each of the treatment groups noted as reminder, anchoring and loss aversion, the 
p-values calculated are lower than the significance level that we selected for our test. This 
indicates that the default rates for these groups are significantly different from the control group 
at a significance level of α = 0,05. Adding to this, the aforementioned treatment groups have t-
values that are lower than the critical t (t < -tα). This empirical evidence leads us to conclude that 
we can reject H0 for these treatment groups. We have found grounds to state that the default rates 
for these treatments groups are significantly lower than the default rate in the control group. Our 
nudges seem to have served their purpose. As could be expected, the t-test reveals that the 
treatment group that received the message based on social norms, is neither significantly different 
from the control at α0,05 nor is there grounds for rejecting H0 as the t-value is not smaller than the 
critical t-value (0,878 >- tα). We have not found evidence that this nudge has lowered the default 
rate. 
Testing our findings from March 
Table 4.7 summarizes the t-values and p-values found by conducting a t-test between each 
treatment group and the control group in March. 
Table 4.7: Results from t-test between treatment groups and control group, March 2013 
 T-value p-value 
T-test Reminder vs Control -2,868 < -tα P = 0,004 < α0,05 
T-test Anchoring vs Control 0,189 > -tα P = 0,850 > α0,05 
T-test Loss aversion vs Control -1,194 > -tα P = 0,223 > α0,05 
T-test Social norms vs Control 0,742 > -tα P = 0,458 > α0,05 
 
We can see that the results from testing our data are very different in March when compared to 
February. The data conveyed in table 4.7 tells us that only the treatment group that received the 
reminder had a significantly different default rate from the control group in this month. It was 
also the only group that produced a t-value that was lower than the critical t-value. This means 
that we are able to reject H0 only in the case of the group that received the common reminder, 
suggesting that this particular nudge had a longer term effect. In the section on descriptive 
statistics we noticed that loss aversion might also have a longer term effect due to observable 
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lower default rates than the control group. By performing the t-test we see that this relationship 
was not significant, and we are unable to reject H0 for this treatment group. We have found 
evidence supporting that is was only the common reminder that produced default rates indicating 
a prolonged effect in the month following actual treatment. 
Comparing our findings for each treatment group between February and March  
Even though it seemd fairly clear that the messages in general did not have a significant lasting 
effect on the treatment groups, we performed a paired samples t-test to examine to what degree 
the results differed in each group between February and March. If there is a significant difference 
between the results obtained in a tretment group in February and the results obtained from the 
same treatment group in March, we can at least provide evidence that the effect of the treatment 
is not the same, or close to similar, in both months. 
Table 4.8: Results from t-test between February and March for each treatment group 
 p-value 
T-test Reminder February vs Reminder March P < 0,001 < α0,05 
T-test Anchoring February vs Anchoring March P < 0,001 < α0,05 
T-test Loss aversion February vs Loss aversion March P < 0,001 < α0,05 
T-test Social norms February vs Social norms March P < 0,001 < α0,05 
 
By conducting a paired samples t-test we found that with 95 % certainty there was a statistically 
significant difference between the results from February and March, for each of the treatment 
groups. This means that any effects found on default rates in February did not directly transfer to 
the default rates in March.  
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5. Conclusions 
In this section, after having presented, reviewed and statistically tested our data material, we are 
able to make some inferences about the study performed. 
5.1 Discussion of findings 
The results from February indicated that three of our messages had the effect of significantly 
lowering default rates on the bill following the treatment. This is in line with previous research 
and what we had initially anticipated. The treatment groups that received the common reminder, 
the message based on the anchoring-effect and the message based on loss aversion, all had 
default rates that were significantly lower than the control group in February. We stipulated that 
it would be possible to influence people’s decision-making process by introducing such external 
stimuli. As projected, our findings indicate that nudging using text messages as the external 
stimuli has served to influence people’s decision-making process in the form of more people 
choosing to pay their bills on time. With that being said, the actual effect of the messages on 
default rates differed. This difference in observed effect may be explained by the differences in 
content of the text messages. 
The common reminder had the best results in terms of lowering the default rate, indicating a 200 
per cent difference compared to the control group in February. There might be several reasons for 
why this particular nudge had such a positive effect. The most intuitive reason for any positive 
effect of this nudge would be that simply reminding customers of an upcoming bill, shifts 
people´s attention from other tasks or spendings to ensure that the particular bill is paid, thereby 
generating more people to pay within due date. Here, we might have captured those who simply 
forget that they have received a bill to be paid and the upcoming due date, or those who may 
otherwise choose to spend their last money of the month on other things. But, as the other 
messages also contained a reminder, this explanation is insufficient in explaining why this 
particular message had a better effect on the default rate than the other messages that also proved 
effective in reducing defaulted payments. When compared to these two other messages, the pure 
reminder was very short and concise, which increases the probability of the message being read 
and fully understood. Also, by leaving out any additional information, i.e. any other type of 
influence, the message may be perceived as a mild “slap on the wrist”, giving the impression that 
65 
 
the company perceives you, or their customers in general, to be likely not to pay on time. This 
may in turn make people want to “improve” their behavior and/or prove the company wrong. 
This reasoning might also help explain why this specific treatment group had the lowest default 
rates in March as well.  The message might have felt unpleasant to receive, and is therefore likely 
to be remembered and acted on in the future. By continuing to pay the bill on time, the customer 
ensures that the message will not be repeated in the future.  
All the text messages that were distributed contained a reminder that the customer had an 
outstanding bill that was due within a few days. We had anticipated that the nudges based on 
heuristics and biases, i.e. the text messages with additional information to the pure reminder, 
would have a stacking effect; enhancing the effect of the pure reminder and maybe even give a 
synergy effect. This proved not to be the case as these messages produced slightly higher default 
rates than the simple reminder, though lower than the control group. All the reminders should, in 
theory, equally serve to remind the customers about the upcoming due date. We expected that the 
additional information would influence the customer to a greater extent than the reminder alone, 
producing an even lower default rate than the reminder-nudge. The message based on the 
anchoring-effect and the message based on loss aversion did produce significant results, 
indicating that they had the expected effect, but still produced higher default rates than the group 
of customers that received the common reminder. This discrepancy in results may stem from 
different reasons. One possible explanation is that these messages influenced the decision-making 
process in different ways than the simple reminder. The message focusing on an added fee if 
defaulting payment, highlighted the cost side of the issue. This could be an effective way to 
influence those that were not already familiar with the actual consequences of defaulting on bills. 
The message that focused on the anchor, informed people that paying within due is the only way 
to avoid paying for services they have not made use of. This might have captured those 
individuals that are conscious about not wasting their money. So, compared to the reminder, we 
might have influenced different aspects of the payment decision. Regardless, it was interesting to 
see that these effects did not add to the reminder-effect, and resulted in fewer people paying on 
time than in the group that received the reminder. We expected that the messages developed 
according to decision-making theory would capture individuals based on heuristics and biases as 
well as influencing those individuals that were prone to forget their financial obligations. One 
explanation for the discrepancy in results may be that the presence of additional information may 
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have changed the point of focus in the messages. It is a possibility that the additional information 
reduced the effectiveness of the reminder by leading the receiver to be overly, or only, focused on 
the additional text. We may have been able to influence the individuals as described above, but 
failed to influence those who simply needed to be reminded. It may also be the case that the 
messages were simply too long. Most modern cell phones show a preview of a received text 
message, most of the times in full, making it impossible to ignore. We are relatively certain that 
most people will read the text messages they receive, but if entire message is not shown in the 
preview, there is a possibility that test subjects have refrained from opening and reading the 
entire message, overlooking the content of the continuous text. 
The results found in the group that received the message based on social norms were unexpected, 
and thereby in itself interesting. We had expected to observe a clear reduction in default rates 
compared to the control group. This expectation was based on previous studies and theory, in 
addition to the pre-test conducted before starting this project. Combined, this knowledge made us 
anticipate that this was the group in which we would find the best results. As our experiment 
strongly resembles Allcott’s study from 2011; successfully reducing people’s energy 
consumption using nudging based on social norms, as well as the study performed in 2012 on tax 
compliance in Britain, we had expected to find that this nudge would noticeably lower default 
rates for bill payments. Instead, we found the opposite effect to be present in both months of 
recording payments. The appointed group that received this nudge had a higher default rate than 
the group that was not subjected to any treatment, both in February and in March. Based on our 
findings we do not have grounds to claim that nudging based on social norms does in fact 
increase default rates, but we cannot eliminate the possibility of this negative effect being a direct 
result of our nudge in this specific case. We have tried to find explanations for why this nudge 
proved ineffective. One possibility is that the text message was too long, as it was the longest 
message sent to the treatments groups. As mentioned above, on most modern cell phones the 
message will appear on the screen without it physically being opened. It is possible that this 
message was too long to initially fit the screen. This could mean that people did not bother to 
open and read it properly, or simply disregard the content due to its inconvenient length. This 
should lead to a default rate quite similar to the control group. The fact that the results showed a 
higher default rate for this group than in the control group, suggests that the message might have 
discouraged some of the customers from paying on time. It is possible that the message was 
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perceived to be intrusive. But, as people are not likely to “get back” at the company by not 
paying their bill on time, a more probable explanation for our findings is that people might have 
misinterpreted the content of the message. We had hoped that people would respond by wanting 
to act in consistency with an accepted social norm, and act according to what the majority of 
people perceive to be the correct decision. We might, however, have ended up with sending a 
signal that most people pay on time so that it’s quite all right for the specific customer not to. If 
this was the case, our nudge was incorrectly formulated, did not serve its intended purpose, and 
thereby indicated to be counter-effective. It might also be the case that nudging based on social 
norms has a different effect in writing than it would have if communicated in person; nudging 
based on social norms might require a physical social setting. The explanation for the 
discrepancies between our expectations and our findings may also be a result of differences in 
contexts and demographics; the experiments we have previously presented were conducted in a 
different context and studied the effect of social nudging on a different demographic than ours. 
The demographic in these experiments was mostly settled adults at a later stage in the life cycle, 
whereas our demographic is young adults. This is supported by the findings of Gulbrandsen 
(1999); if propensity to default is a result of people´s moral, and morality is continuously 
developed throughout the life cycle, this could help to explain the relatively high default rates in 
this particular group. It might also be that young adults have a lesser need to be part of the 
socially accepted group in terms of bill payments.  
When looking for a longer term effect of the nudges, we found that most of our successful text 
messages lost their effect in March. We were only able to find indications of a prolonged effect 
on default rates in the group that received the common reminder, though this effect was also 
decreasing compared to the previous month. The results from the statistical tests showed that 
there was a significant difference between the results in February and the results from March, for 
all treatment groups that showed lower default rates in February. This implied that the results 
found in February did not directly transfer to March for any of the nudges. As mentioned, the 
group that received the pure reminder had a significantly lower default rate compared to the 
control group also in March. But the effect did not directly transfer by being equal in both 
months. This fact indicates that people would need repeated nudges to eliminate a sporadic effect. 
This may simply be due to people’s forgetfulness and the short-term impact these text messages 
give. The reminder could easily be repeated, but the other nudges would have to be somewhat 
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varied not to seem forced. On the other hand, if these text messages were to be distributed on a 
regular basis, one would expect a decreasing effect due to the customers’ familiarity of the 
content. Repeating the nudges could be perceived as nagging, not nudging.  
We also wish to comment on which individuals we believe to have successfully nudged. We have 
previously presented Brusdal and Berg’s characterization of how young adults with financial 
difficulties can be divided into four categories based on behavioral traits. The behavioral traits of 
individuals in each of our treatment groups may have affected the results of our study. We 
believe to have successfully nudged individuals falling under the “absent-minded” or the 
“shopper” categories. The individuals portrayed as being “absent-minded” are generally forgetful 
and do not have adequate overview of their financial situation. These individuals may have been 
affected by the reminder as they clearly could benefit from receiving one, and the message based 
on the anchoring-effect as this message contains information about the added fee that they may 
not have known or forgot. The “shopper” is typically shortsighted and lacks impulse control. The 
message based on loss aversion or the message based on the anchoring-effect may have produced 
a positive response from these individuals. By making them aware of the cost of defaulting 
payment, or that they will pay more than necessary by not paying on time, we believe that this 
information is taken into consideration when prioritizing where to spend their money. It is 
doubtful that we have been able to influence individuals belonging to the “victim” or the 
“juggler” categories. People with these traits typically do not take responsibility for their own 
actions, by blaming someone else or purposely cheating the system. It is unlikely that our nudges 
would affect the decision-making process of such individuals as they do not accept their own role 
of the problem. With this being said, we do not have any evidence to support which type of 
individuals we have successfully affected, and cannot further comment on the distribution of 
behavioral traits within our treatment groups. 
Other remarks to our findings 
We also have comment on the fluctuations in default rates in the control group and in the total 
demographic. Had our findings been ambiguous when comparing the treatment groups to the 
control group of each month, we would have had to further investigate these fluctuations. It is 
normal to have a slight difference in default rates from one month to the next, and from one 
group to another. As the differences were so small that they could be explained by natural 
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fluctuations, we did not find a need to investigate this any further. We also recorded a slight 
increase in default rates in March, for both 2012 and 2013. This has been explained by One Call 
to be normal, as there are several public fees and payments that are due during this particular 
month of the year. Cell phone bills will typically not be given priority until such bills are paid, as 
cell phone bills are often perceived to be less important. We also registered a general increase in 
total default rates from 2012 to 2013. This could be explained by two major factors. First, during 
the last decade there has been a steady increase in financial difficulties, credit-debt and defaults 
in Norway, especially accounted for by young adults. The increasing default rates for One Call’s 
customer base may be a consequence of a general societal development. Second, we also have to 
take into account the rapid growth of One Call’s customer base aged 18-30, which has almost 
doubled in one year. The youngest customers are usually the ones with the most severe financial 
difficulties. A big part of the new customers might be in the group of younger adults, as this is 
One Call’s target market. This might also help explain the general growth in default rates. 
We considered using the default rates from the entire population, being One Call’s customer base 
aged 18-30, as the control group. This would have given more accurate picture of default rates for 
individuals that did not receive treatment. However, we chose to use a control group consisting of 
500 people for two reasons: Firstly, it would have been a complicated process to separate the 
2000 individuals that received treatment from the entire population. So there was a cost issue in 
terms of using the population as a whole. Secondly, using the same number of people in all 
groups simplified the statistical testing of the data material. As the differences in default rates 
between the total demographic and the control group are fairly small, we considered the 
differences to be insignificant for the study and the conclusions drawn. 
5.2 Limitations 
We acknowledge there are several limitations to our experiment. In this section we address some 
of these limitations and discuss how these affected the study. 
When conducting the experiment for our Master’s Thesis, we faced two critical constraints; time 
and resources. It would not be possible to conduct the experiment if we did not get started in time 
to execute the treatments and collect data material from the following two months. With five 
months to work on our thesis, time was of the essence. Had we been able to collect data for a 
longer period of time, both prior to and following the selected time period, we would have been 
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able to further establish any relations found and tested the data more thoroughly. Also, we have 
not been able to exclude particular circumstances that might affect our study. Current 
economical, political and social conditions, in addition to others, may have affected the results. 
To hedge against such influence, one would have to extensively expan the timeframe of the 
study. Another constraint was resources - both the collaborating company’s and ours. We had to 
balance the extent of our study against the restraints of being students, and against the need to 
find a willing company and their possibilities for execution. We also had to adapt and adhere to 
some of the company’s wishes. 
We were not able to record payments from individual customers in the experiment, nor do we 
have any characteristics of the subjects. We have only been able to collect data on an aggregated 
group level, disregarding individual response to the treatment and whether the effect might have 
relations to specific characteristics. We chose to not request this information from One Call due 
to limited time and resources. Had we been able to track the development of each subject, we 
could have detected the individual response to the treatment over time, and possible relations 
between specific characteristics and the effect of nudging. Also, we cannot be sure that the 
subjects who defaulted February’s bill are the same individuals who defaulted their payment in 
March. Had we been able to track individuals, and had more information about them, we would 
have had a more extensive study and subsequently more detailed results. Due to the lack of 
individual tracking it has not been possible for us to differentiate between reasons for why people 
do not pay their bills on time. We are not able to pinpoint whether people actively chose not to 
pay, forgot to pay, or if they did not have the available funds to pay on time. As we only recorded 
payments on an aggregated group level, not knowing who pays when or anything about who they 
are, we cannot make inferences about any specific tendencies for why people typically default on 
bill payments.  
We also need to recognize that the nature of our data material limited the possibilities for 
statistical analysis. Initially we opted to use regression analysis to analyze the data material, 
calculating statistical relations and possibly provide grounds for prediction. But the use of such 
models would not provide any useful information, nor would it help explain our findings. This is 
partly due to our data being recorded at a group level and partly due to the very limited time span 
for the experiment. 
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In terms of the results, our findings might in part be result of a «first-mover effect». The 
treatment, being text messages, is not yet frequently used to influence people’s decision-making 
process. This means that the effect might have been enhanced simply by being new and 
unfamiliar to the receiver. If every company sent out such messages for all kinds of tasks and 
events, one could assume that the effect would be reduced or maybe even loose its effect 
completely. Another important point in this regard is that the effect might have transfferred onto 
other bills for which the individual did not receive a text message. Receiving a text message 
reminding the customer to pay the particular bill, may trigger the memory onto other bills that are 
perceived to be more important, or due prior to the cell phone bill, possibly leaving the cell phone 
bill unpaid. We need to recognize the possibility that this could have happened. 
5.3 Implications 
The results from our study provide new evidence to support theory on the effect of nudging 
people’s decision-making process. Our thesis gives a valid contribution to this growing field of 
research and hopefully active use of nudging as physiological tool to enhance the quality of 
people’s decisions. 
5.3.1 Practical implications 
The results demonstrate that nudging may reduce default rates accounted for by young adults, and 
may in turn help to reduce the financial difficulties individuals in this age group may incur due to 
defaulted payments. This depends on companies’ active use of nudging when collecting 
payments from people in this age group. 
The study performed has used a new approach to overcome problems of payment defaults. The 
results provide evidence supporting the usefulness of nudging as an addition to current means for 
payment collection. As we have not studied the effect of our nudges when removing existing 
collection tools of the industry, we cannot conclude that nudging would work in a setting where 
added fees and other sanctions are absent. Therefore, our contribution to the practical use of 
nudging is limited to being only an addition to working regulations. 
Distinguishing between people who pay their bills promptly and people who have previously 
defaulted on their bill payments, may provide for more effective use of nudges in this setting. As 
we have sent out the text messages to randomly selected samples, we have not been able to 
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observe the effect of specifically targeting those who struggle to pay on time. By only nudging 
those who have previously defaulted payments, companies may use nudging theory more 
effectively in their payment collection process as a tool to reduce default rates. 
The results of our study are highly relevant for companies that collect payments. As the common 
reminder produced the best result, the usefulness of our thesis is not only limited to the 
companies that collect payment, but also companies that need to remind their customers of 
upcoming appointments or events. This suggests that nudging through text messages can be used 
in a broader business setting. 
5.3.2 Implications for research 
The results from this study have implications for future research on people’s decision-making 
process, personal finances, and the concept of nudging specifically. 
In our experiment we have not been able to record individual responses to the text messages. 
Replicating the experiment with individual tracking would provide data for more in depth 
analysis of individual responses, producing possible grounds for making predictions of the effect. 
This would make it possible to define the characteristics of those who respond positively to being 
nudged, and pinpoint these people in future efforts to reduce default rates. It would also be of 
great value to other industries to investigate whether our results could be transferrable to a 
different context. This could provide basis for active use of nudging to collect payments. 
Our findings concerning using social norms to influence the decision-making process of 
individuals is not in line with theory and past research on this phenomenon. The results give 
reason to doubt that social norms can be used to influence young adults in terms of payment 
behavior. Before we can conclude on the usefulness of this effect, more studies need to be 
performed. One way to test whether this type of nudge could be effective on bill payments would 
be to replicate the experiment using an older age group. It might be that more settled adults, who 
have different characteristics from our sample, would respond positively to this type of nudge as 
opposed to the age group used in our experiment. We also recognize that the formulation of the 
nudge may have failed to serve its purpose. It might be that re-formulating the message would 
produce a positive effect on lowering default rates. 
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If we assume that the positive effect of the common reminder on both months can be directly 
attributed to the nudge, it would be interesting to further investigate the duration of the effect. If it 
is possible to track the duration of the effect, this may indicate how frequent the company should 
repeat the nudge to keep default rates to a minimum. 
Future research on nudging could study the effect of repeated treatment; either the effects of 
repeating the same type of nudge several times, or testing if there can be effects found from 
subjecting individuals to different types of nudges over time. We have not been able to uncover 
past research on the interaction effect of different nudges, so this would be an especially 
interesting phenomenon to study further. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
The research question for this thesis asked if nudging young adults may reduce their propencity 
to default on cell phone bills. The empirical evidence put forth through our analysis suggests that 
nudging using simple and inexpensive text messages has the potential to significantly lower the 
default rates accounted for by this age group. Our findings thereby support Thaler and Sunstein’s 
theory that nudging the decision-making process may help people make better choices for 
themselves. If nudging was to be actively used by companies dealing with payment collection, 
this method of positive influence has great potential to help combat the increasing problems 
realted to financial difficulties faced by young adults. 
Through our study we have uncovered the importance of the information convayed in terms of 
written nudges. The content of the messages distributed in our experiment produced different 
results depending on the information included in the message, in terms of lowering default rates 
for bill payments. We have not been able to find empirical evidence supporting a positive effect 
from basing our message on accepted social norms. We did, however, find significant results 
from using a common reminder, a message based on the achoring-effect, and a message based on 
loss aversion, on the bill following treatment. 
In the context of our study, we have found evidence supporting that nudging people’s decision-
making process will produce positive, but relatively short term effects on young adults´ payment 
behavior. To sustain the effect, people seem to need repeated nudging over time not to fall back 
into old patterns, and maybe form improved and longer lasting habits. Allthough we are not able 
to suggest at what frequency companies should make use of nudging, our findings did reveal a 
reduced effect over time from our nudges on lowering default rates. 
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Appendix: Data analysis (SPSS) 
A1: Results from T-tests; comparing the effect of each nudge against the control group of 
the month 
Nudging using a reminder compared to the control group, February: 
 
Nudging using a reminder compared to the control group, March: 
 
Nudging based on the anchoring-effect compared to the control group, February: 
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Nudging based on the anchoring-effect compared to the control group, March: 
 
Nudging based on loss aversion compared to the control group, February: 
 
Nudging based on loss aversion compared to the control group, March: 
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Nudging based on social norms compared to the control group, February: 
 
Nudging based on social norms compared to the control group, March: 
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A2: Results from T-tests; comparing the effect of each nudge between February and March  
 
